The FAQ and not so FAQ
The ‘Frequently’ on these is always a bit of a wager, and to start it off we will answer questions that have actually been asked. Do write in with your own. As it grows, we’ll try to organise it.
Q: Who are you?
A: The work was coordinated by Mark H Burton, of Steady State Manchester, with material also written by Carolyn Kagan, Rebecca Saville, and David Madigan -> read more.
Q: On energy, I would like to know more about how the UK could achieve absolute zero fossil fuel use by 2035 and source 100% energy from renewables by 2040.
A: In theory, that could be done since nuclear is in the mix (whether we like it or not). However, I think your point is that the goal of 100% renewable energy by 2040 is a bit late if there is to be zero fossil fuel use by 2035! That’s something we’ll align better in any later edition.
Q: A related question is why the 2035 net zero date? How feasible is it?
A: We started from the statement, from Lamboll et al.: “For a 90% chance of keeping below 2C, emissions would have to hit net zero in about 2035”1. Then we did some pathway calculations, using zero emissions dates of 2030, 2035 and the UK government’s date of 2050. There wasn’t a particular science to that: we just picked 2035 as less aggressive than 2030 and more in keeping with the science than the government, and EU trajectories. No assumption has been made for carbon removal technologies. In our Greater Manchester there is a voluntary, fair share carbon budget with a zero date of 20382 (we are overshooting though)3. We are just pushing a bit harder. In practice, our guess is that it might be relaxed to say 2040 (a figure we’ve used for 100% reenewable energy), but the priority is big cuts now, since emissions are cumulative.
Of course, there are huge challenges of feasibility (technical and political) but it is important to “bend the stick” for a more radical approach than the complacent one we currently have. We’ve described the targets as illustrative, or indicative ones, so while the principle of the emergency brake is mandatory, the precise details would need more attention.
Q: Why is public ownership of energy companies (rather than regulation, for example) seen to be necessary for the energy transition?
A: It is hard to see the necessary changes taking place while the profit motive is the fundamental source of governance for the energy industry. This country once had publicly owned utilities, and the expansion of the power grid probably would not have happened without public ownership. Regulation alone, is likely to be a weak tool without tackling the primary economic driver, as we have seen with railways, buses, water and the finance sector. This doesn’t mean that there is no role for the non-government sector, particularly at the ‘innovation frontier’ and also in community run and owned energy.
Q: On housing, I couldn’t find a mention of the need to provide social housing for lower-income groups, but maybe I missed this somewhere? Also, I’d like to know how a mass retrofitting programme can be completed by 2035, especially if devolved to local authorities.
A: It is in there, particularly in Appendix 2 but maybe the specific need should be brought out as a strong recommendation. The only way that a mass retrofit programme can be completed in 11 years, will be by a combination of strong central strategic planning and performance management, and devolution to local areas who can plan and manage the delivery. They will need to work in close partnership with a variety of suppliers and contractors, and with local communities and training providers. It’s a huge job and can’t be left to the market, or to a post-code lottery.
Q: On transport, I couldn’t see how the various policies proposed on p14 would be able to result in a 50% reduction in motor vehicle use by 2030 or 75% by 2035, as mentioned on p7. I think more radical policies are needed to achieve this goal, such as free public transport. Fuel tax increases for private cars (e.g. up to and beyond the level they used to be before Sunak was Chancellor) would also provide welcome income to help fund the transition. By ‘zero aviation’ I assume you mean ‘zero carbon aviation’? Either way, I’m in favour of it!
A: That list is very much for starters and, indeed, more radical policies still will probably be needed. Some rigorous quantitative modelling needs doing on this.
Q: On food, I couldn’t find any mention of methane emitted by ruminants. In general, it wasn’t clear how the food system is to be transformed or how the natural environment is to be managed in order to sequester more carbon and increase biodiversity.
A: True, we didn’t mention every aspect!
Q: Isn’t ‘re-shoring’ (p25) just part of a protectionist project?
A: It can be presented (misused?) that way but there is a strong resource case for it in terms both of resource and energy use and in terms of supply chain vulnerabilities. Clear priorities and regulation will be required so that this isn’t simply a matter of transferring harmful industry and over-production from one region to another.
Q: Who is going to do all this? What’s your political strategy, your theory of change?
A: It’s a good question and there isn’t a simple answer. Our working assumptions are roughly as follows:
1) As a small group and not a movement we have to try and interest potential allies and sympathetic people and organisations to take up (some or all) of the ideas and proposals in our manifesto paper. It’s a strategy of trying to influence the influencers.
2) What we are doing here is showing that a degrowth-informed policy framework is possible, tackling some common myths and silences on the way.
3) However, we don’t think the mainstream parties will be adopting our framework just yet. things have to get worse for a broader realisation that we can’t go on as we are to take root. Maybe then this framework is the lifeline that will be needed as panic settles in – for example when the likely incoming Labour government gets unstuck by the winds of climate reality and the accelerating ecosystem and societal collapse.
Q: How do you tackle the “people don’t want to change, to give up things” objection?
A: People will increasingly be forced to see that things can’t go on as they have been. Take energy: as the sources of mined and pumped fuels (coal, oil, gas, uranium) get depleted, the costs of extraction get higher (well before exhaustion) and the return on investment gets lower. This leads to a price spiral and further economic stress. The State will progressively stop subsidising private hydrocarbon use (e.g. for private motor vehicle use) because it will be unaffordable. This is just one dimension of what socialist ecologist Barry Commoner, many years ago, called “The Closing Circle”. What then? The task is to show, without being glib and simplistic, that the “simpler life”, low energy option, degrowth, can be both a credible response but also one that brings benefits in terms of a more satisfying lifestyle. In the jargon, we have to promote co-benefits, show how ecological, social and economic goals can be met together: for example, healthy, more locally produced food uses much less energy (and causes less pollution), brings about better health, through improved nutrition, and yes, exercise, in its production, and to the extent that the profit motive is taken out, by supporting small cultivators, horticultural and distribution co-operatives, and home food gardens and allotments, it has benefits for household expenditure. Similarly for transport: in whose interest is it to sit for hours of the year in polluting, congested traffic, when working closer to home, enjoying cheap or free public transport, and traveling shorter distances under your own steam would mean a far better lifestyle on ecological, social and economic grounds?
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Thanks to Peter Somerville and an anonymous questioner on Mastodon, for most of these questions.
If you have questions, send them in as we’d like to make this a crowdsourced FAQ.
Notes
1Lamboll, R. D., Nicholls, Z. R. J., Smith, C. J., Kikstra, J. S., Byers, E., & Rogelj, J. (2023). Assessing the size and uncertainty of remaining carbon budgets. Nature Climate Change, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-023-01848-5 Also covered by the Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/oct/30/climate-crisis-carbon-emissions-budget
2Kuriakose, J., Anderson, K., Broderick, J., & Mclachlan, C. (2018). Quantifying the implications of the Paris Agreement for Greater Manchester. Tyndall Centre, University of Manchester. https://pure.manchester.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/83000155/Tyndall_Quantifying_Paris_for_Manchester_Report_FINAL_PUBLISHED_rev1.pdf