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Getting Real: full report (html)

 

 

Stop the Damage!
Build a Better Future!

How Britain can face ecological, social and economic perils

 

 

 

 

 

Stop the Damage! Build a Better Future!

 

Stop the Damage! Build a Better Future!

How Britain can face ecological, social and economic perils1.

Contents

Introduction: A Britain where everyone has enough while not destroying the planet that sustains us 4

Statement of Principles 4

Real Policy Priorities for a Viable Future 5

A dose of realism 5

An Emergency Brake 6

A Plan for reconstruction and renewal 11

Energy 12

An energy future for people and planet 13

Livelihoods: a social guarantee 16

Livelihoods for people and planet 16

Income 16

Work 18

Cost of living 21

Summary of measures that will ameliorate the cost of living 21

Production, consumption and food 23

Food production and consumption 23

Manufacturing 25

Human services and housing fit for an uncertain future 27

Health, care and support, education 27

A housing future for people and planet 30

Summary of housing proposals 30

Economic and financial governance (macroeconomic policy, taxation, financial institutions and practices, business) 33

Macroeconomic policy 33

Tax 33

Better taxes, for people and planet 34

Summary of tax proposals 34

Public banking and access to financial institutions 36

Community and alternative banking 36

Insurance 37

Reform of business governance 37

Planning for resilience and democratic civil security 39

Resilience 39

A refocussing of defence spending and a reduction in military expenditure 39

Refocussing the military on civil defence in response to climatic and other shocks 40

Climate justice and the Global South 41

Global inequity 41

A future where the UK takes responsibility for the damage it has done 41

Climate reparations 41

Financial support for just and equitable transitions: climate adaptation and mitigation. 42

Loss and damage fund 43

Contribution from savings on military expenditure to the global Loss and Damage Fund 43

Debt and International Finance Organisations 43

Measuring success 46

Existing government initiatives on measurement in these islands 46

Appendix 1: What no Growth? 47

The problem 47

A viable alternative 48

Appendix 2: A Housing Future for People and Planet 49

Physical 49

Housing and community 50

Supply of housing 50

Demand for housing 51

Reducing the cost of housing in a post-growth world 52

Appendix 3: Reforming taxation, for people and planet 53

Better taxes, for people and planet 53

Wealth 53

Dividends and interest 54

Capital gains 54

Inheritance tax 55

Unrealised assets 55

Land value tax 55

Council tax 55

Business rates 56

Corporation tax 56

Pensions 56

Taxation on goods and services 56

Restructuring income tax 57

Tax avoidance 59

References and sources 60

 

Introduction: A Britain where everyone has enough while not destroying the planet that sustains us

Two profound crises face us, the climate-ecological crisis and the crisis of livelihoods and well-being. Both can be tackled together so people here and beyond our shores can have an economically secure, worry-free and fulfilling life without destroying the living world we all rely on.

The policies we outline in this manifesto are designed to bring about the safer and better life we all deserve. They are radical but achievable. There is no good reason for not adopting policies like these. We challenge all political parties to explain to the people why they refuse to do so. Otherwise, our politicians are sleepwalking to the precipice and taking us with them. They must be honest about the profound seriousness of the situation and the need for unprecedented action.

Our proposals explicitly differ from the mainstream prescription of promoting economic growth as the panacea for economic and social ills. Instead we argue that growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), at least by rich countries, is economically and socially damaging, while not delivering the economic benefits that are claimed for it. Moreover, for a number of reasons, growth has stagnated and is unlikely to return to the levels seen as desirable by the economic orthodoxy, despite efforts based on the standard economic frameworks. We explain our orientation, often called degrowth or post-growth, in Appendix 1.

Statement of Principles2

Care for the earth: repairing the damage done by industrial capitalism and preventing further damage. That means fossil fuel phase-outs, limits to raw material extraction, and nature protection and restoration measures for healthy and resilient air, lands and waters.

Fairness: enabling people, now and in future generations, to have enough of the things they need, with fair shares of the wealth. Secure access to essential infrastructures via an improved, ecologically sensitive welfare state. That means fiscal instruments to foster a more equal society by eradicating income and wealth extremes, as well as super-profits. Care for all people, in all the earth’s regions, which implies funding for loss and damage due to the UK’s historic emissions and environmental damage.

Real democracy: a collaborative, informed, inclusive and democratic approach to formulating socially acceptable sufficiency strategies and to strengthen policies based on ecological limits, fairness and well-being for all. That means a new constitutional settlement based on subsidiarity – with decisions taken at the appropriate level.

Real Policy Priorities for a Viable Future

For the last decade or so it has no longer seemed that people’s lives are generally getting better, which had been the experience, real or illusory, of the post-WW2 period. Now, we are staring at the prospect of collapse of our social and economic system and the natural world that sustains it. The linked crises of the climate and ecological system and the threat to people’s livelihoods and quality of life call for an emergency response, one that has two aspects, a brake and a plan. The brake is necessary to halt the destruction of the life support systems humanity relies on. This includes a more rapid decarbonisation of the economy than the legislated carbon budgets and target dates, but it goes further, recognising that a) decarbonisation will only be effective with a reduction in overall energy and material flows: we extract too much, produce too much, consume too much and waste too much; and b) that the ecological and planetary systems crisis goes beyond the carbon pollution-induced climate emergency to include the other natural systems and planetary boundaries. Notably, biodiversity loss, biogeochemical flows in the nitrogen and phosphorous cycles, land use change and chemical pollution are known to have exceeded the safe planetary boundary, while ocean acidification is approaching the limit (Richardson et al., 2023).

A dose of realism

Moving from lifestyles that are threatening the continued viability of our planet to lifestyles that will allow the current global population of some eight billion humans to enjoy meaningful and fulfilling lives alongside a regenerated natural world will require major changes in behaviour and expectations. For people in the Global North, and in particular for the wealthiest 5–10 percent, those changes could feel like sacrifices: buying new things less often, eating meat less often, travelling less and more slowly. For the majority, however, the benefits are likely to outweigh the sacrifices: less meaningless toil (W. Morris, 1884), less stress, taking responsibility for our own well-being, more time spent with family and other people we value, time to learn new skills and follow our passions, feeling included and having our voices listened to. For people in the Global South, a fairer distribution of resources and the ability to keep resources rather than having them appropriated by the Global North (Hickel, Dorninger, et al., 2022) will lead to increases in standards of living even by today’s standards. Moreover, it is likely that the decrease in inequality that would be brought about by measures described in this paper would lead to reductions in crime (Metz & Burdina, 2016), including crime targeted at the affluent. It would probably also contribute to significant improvements in physical health, mental health, drug abuse, education, imprisonment, obesity, social mobility, trust and community life, violence, teenage pregnancies, and child well-being (R. Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). So, while some in society will have to make challenging lifestyle changes, even for these individuals the situation is not clear cut; the measures being proposed would deliver tangible and meaningful benefits for virtually everyone.

An Emergency Brake

The climate and ecological crisis is worsening every day with news of breached records, extreme weather events, extinctions and other damage to nature and dire forecasts about the future. It is the result of excessive flows of energy and materials through our economy (Ripple et al., 2019, 2023) leading to damage to the natural world both here and throughout the world, deadly pollution by carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, plastic particles and a variety of long-lasting toxic chemicals, and the depletion of many resources to the point where the costs of their extraction is becoming a driver of economic collapse (Richardson et al., 2023). This has to stop and that slowdown has to be planned and managed rather than imposed by the crisis itself, or people will get hurt.

When a vehicle is racing headlong towards an obstacle, an emergency brake, or emergency stop, is the only valid response. Yet as our economic system, with its ever-increasing resource exploitation and emissions, hurtles towards an abyss, the typical response seems to be to carry on almost regardless, with no more than tweaks, minor in scale, such as a few more wind turbines or a bit more recycling. It is time to use the emergency brake. That means, radically reducing overall material and energy usage, but doing it in ways that do as little harm as possible, while using the opportunity to rethink the way we live.

There is another reason for our emphasis on rapid emergency action, global justice. The ecological footprint of the UK is estimated to be equivalent to ‘2.4 earths’ (Global footprint network, 2023). That is, the country uses 2.4 times the global biocapacity available for its population were we to live within the planet’s means. In the case of carbon emissions, the current national targets assume continuing to use a disproportionate share of the global carbon budget, up until 2050, and then beyond (Calverley & Anderson, 2022).

We therefore call for the following key actions. For each we have provided, where possible, a baseline and an indicative target. The targets are to provide an idea of the kind of policy actions that could be implemented for these Emergency Brake areas. The actual targets will not necessarily be identical with these so long as the primary aim is met.

  • An annual and rapidly reducing limit on the amount of fossil fuels that can be burnt in the UK – a cap on the supply side with fair rationing.

Current level

Indicative target

Expected impact

2021:  143.329 Mtoe 
‘The UK used a total of almost 176 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) of energy in 2021, with 80% coming from fossil fuels.’ (ONS, 2023).

Absolute zero fossil fuel use by 2035 (possible small residual uses for plastics?). Assumes no greenhouse gas removal technology (also called negative emissions technologies, e.g. CCS).

Average annual reduction in use by 7.49% of the baseline year, or 10.737 Mtoe. This is the minimum implied by the latest global warming forecast (Lamboll et al., 2023).

Other options considered:
Campaigners have called for zero fossil fuel use by 2030. We see that as unrealisable. It would require reductions of 11.67% of the baseline year, or 16.731 Mtoe annually.

The UK government’s date of 2050 (were it to aim for absolute zero) would imply an annual reduction of 3.51% of the baseline of 5.04%, or an overall reduction of 66% by 2040 (while the EU posits 73% by 2040, our calculation, based on Hancock, 2024). This would be inadequate, especially since it is possible that the estimates of the remaining carbon budget are an underestimate (Hansen, 2023, see also Milman, 2023).

Mitigation pathway for territorial emissions to absolute zero by 2035.

This would have consequences for every area of activity, which will need to be shared equitably, protecting the more vulnerable. Existing proposals include ‘cap and share’ and ‘cap and adapt’. (Davey, 2012; L. Edwards & Cox, 2020).

 

  • An annual and rapidly reducing cap on imports that are fossil fuel intensive.

Current level

Indicative target

Expected impact

137.65 Mt CO2

Estimated CO2 component of imports in 2020 (G. P. Peters et al., 2012, as updated by Global Carbon Project, 2022).

UK government is to introduce a carbon border tax on iron, steel, cement and ceramics from 2027 (Davies, 2023).

10% of 2020 estimate by 2035, i.e. a cap of 13.8 Mt CO2 p.a.

The likely mechanism would be an enhanced carbon border adjustment mechanism (carbon import tax) to be implemented by the EU from 2026. The key to reducing emissions progressively would be linking it to an overall cap on the carbon embedded in imports.

Radical reduction in imports (cars and clothing are the first and third largest imports by monetary value, UK government, 2021) which will require an ambitious programme for food security/sovereignty, reuse, repair and recycling, and high taxation of luxury goods.

A carbon import tax, linked to a reducing cap, would raise funds for public replacement industry investment and allow a phased adaptation to the new reality.

 

  • A massive programme to make buildings as heat-tight as possible.

Current level

Indicative target

Expected impact

Total domestic energy use: 34.3 Mtoe of which 63.79% is gas (BEIS, 2022: Table 1.1.5).

Dwellings in England and Wales have a median energy efficiency rating in band D, with scores of 68 and 66 respectively (Office for National Statistics, 2023).

Domestic buildings to have median energy efficiency rating of at least 80% (bottom of band B) by 2035.

All new builds to have rating of at least 92% (bottom of band A).

All fossil fuel boilers to be replaced, chiefly by heat pumps.

Lower heating bills, warmer homes, lower carbon emissions.

Will require government funding and subsidies.

 

  • A presumption of protection of green spaces from building, with carbon caps for the building industry.

Current level

Indicative target

Expected impact

In the three years from 2019–20 to 2021–22, 31,500 ha (net) of land previously developed was built on. (Department for Levelling Up, Housing & Communities, 2023) Between 2010 and 2022, 14,415 ha of Grade 1, 2 and identified Grade 3a agricultural land was built on (55% for housing), a 0.6% loss of total identified ‘Best and Most Versatile’ agricultural land. (CPRE, 2022).

A firm presumption against development on green space3.

All building development to be genuinely net zero (i.e. including embodied carbon) by 20304.

Local Authorities to agree programmes, with Natural England, the Environment Agency and landowners, for enhancing carbon sequestration and biodiversity for green spaces in their area.

Development activity reorientated to refurbishment, extension and retrofitting. (For analysis of the carbon cost of the current home-building targets and alternative policy proposals, see Ermgassen et al., 2022). What new build there is will be largely on previously developed land and only very exceptionally on green space. Rapid development of supply chains for net zero carbon building materials.

A gentle densification of urban space, while preserving the store of green spaces for nature, amenity and food production.

Redeployment and retraining of building workers to the national retrofit priority.

 

  • Measures to enable people to use lower carbon forms of transport (public transport and active travel), together with disincentives applied to carbon-intense forms of transport, principally aviation and private motor car use.

Current level

Indicative target

Expected impact

Cars: 244.0 billion vehicle miles (2022)

Vans: 57.5 billion vehicle miles (2022)

Lorries: 17.4 billion vehicle miles (2022)
Buses and coaches 2.1 billion vehicle miles (2022)
(Department for Transport, n.d.)

Hard to specify; could be a reduction of 50% by 2030, 75% by 2035 for each type other than buses which would increase, maybe by 400%.

Far lower carbon emissions.

Urban areas become more liveable due to the reduction in traffic with cleaner air.

Need for a major redeployment programme for workers in the affected industries.

 

  • An annually reducing cap on consumption of mineral resources.

Current level

Indicative target

Expected impact

Hard to quantify overall. Would need a baseline audit of the principal minerals used.

Use fossil fuel imports as a proxy while quantification is being developed.

Prevention of rebound impacts and mitigation of excessive extraction and exploitation in the Majority World/Global South.

 

  • Emergency livelihoods protection to ensure basic needs are met.

Should the emergency brake actions and/or worsening eco-geopolitical conditions lead to threats to livelihoods, then emergency measures would be put in place to protect citizens. As Vogel et al. argue (2024), given that reductions in economic output are likely anyway (and not solely due to Emergency Brake actions), citizen protection should focus on citizens’ vulnerability to output reductions, rather than on trying to restore output. There are several ways of doing this: Vogel et al. identify the Social Guarantee (Button & Coote, 2021) and the Universal Autonomy Allowance (Liegey & Nelson, 2020) as promising packages of measures. On an emergency basis, as the latter authors suggest, there could be a transitory, or emergency, citizens’ income, which would need to be coordinated with rent controls, to ensure those affected by the above measures have their basic needs met. Criteria could be set for turning this emergency response on and off. There is further discussion of social guarantees in Plan section ‘Livelihoods: a social guarantee’.

Current level

Indicative target

Expected impact

Nil, other than non-means-tested benefits, e.g. State Pension, Child Benefit.

At a defined threshold of median income reduction, implementation of an emergency citizens’ income at a level equivalent to the real Living Wage, adjusted per household to cover basic needs.

To consider whether this covers everyone or just those below a certain household income level (there are pros and cons for both).

Rents should be capped at less than any rise in the Minimum Wage and state benefits.

A safety net for all citizens during the very tough period as the emergency brake is applied.

Note that indices of health and well-being could rise during a well-managed contraction and renewal process.

 

A Plan for reconstruction and renewal

Beyond the emergency brake measures, we call for a national plan for social and economic reconstruction.

The Plan actions and policies do not necessarily come after the Emergency Brake ones: most Emergency Brake policies themselves will be applied over a number of years. Broadly speaking, while the Emergency Brake is the country’s contribution to stopping and slowing the ecological overshoot and climate emergency, the Plan is a set of positive actions by which this country can build a future for human well-being within the planetary boundaries.

We recognise that it will not be easy to implement these policies and actions. For one thing, there will be resistance from vested interests and the spreading of disinformation about the content, its likely impacts and the motivations of those enacting the approach (Hickel, Kallis, et al., 2022). Implementation will require a coherent political and public education strategy which is not covered here.

The Plan has the following key elements:

Energy,
Livelihoods,
Production, consumption and food,
Human services and housing,
Economic and financial governance (macroeconomics, tax, finance, business),
Resilience and democratic civil security,
Climate justice and the Global South.

 

Energy

We need to rapidly reduce energy demand, phasing out carbon-polluting energy sources and replacing them with renewable sources. Ensure that everyone has access to sufficient energy to maintain health, comfort and dignity and that nobody squanders or takes more than their fair share of energy.

Why it’s important

As the UKFIRES group, based at the University of Cambridge, has said:

‘If we only used electricity, delivering all the transport, heat and goods we use in the UK would require 3x more electricity than we use today. If we expand renewables as fast as we can, we could deliver about 60% of this requirement with zero emissions in 2050. Therefore, in 2050 we must plan to use 40% less energy than we use today, and all of it must be electric.’ (Allwood et al., 2019).

Barrett et al. (2022, p. 731) note that

‘Without energy demand reduction, short-term climate targets are unlikely to be reached and long-term net-zero ambitions will need to rely on expensive and unproven CDR technologies, increasing the risk of failing to achieve the global goals of the Paris Agreement.’

They find that by implementing energy demand measures, encompassing transformative changes in technologies, social practices, infrastructure and institutions, electricity supply would only need to be increased by some 44%, compared to the 150% expansion required if only energy efficiency measures were implemented (Barrett et al., 2022, pp. 728–730).

In other words, what has to be done is not simply the replacement of fossil fuels with renewable sources, but a very substantial reduction in energy use overall. However, this is in a context where there are huge disparities in energy consumption across the population. While some people cannot afford to keep warm or to travel to meet their basic needs, others enjoy profligate high energy lifestyles. Collectively, a lot of energy is wasted, from leaky buildings, from individualistic means of transport (primarily cars), by wasteful and polluting industrial processes, and by wasteful patterns of consumption. Millward-Hopkins and Elliott (2023) found that while

‘… a low-energy-demand future in the UK accompanied by current trends in inequality – in income, technological access, and energy use – could leave ~10 % of the population lacking sufficient energy for meeting decent living standards (7–9 million people). A substantial reduction in income inequality to fair levels could eliminate this outcome, as could an increase in technological equality accompanied by a flattening of the current rise in income inequality.’

An energy future for people and planet

  • Establish a programme for serious energy conservation and decarbonisation. A comprehensive ‘Energy Act: Conservation and Decarbonisation’ should be enacted. Among its provisions would be:

        • Immediately end new oil and gas exploration, both in UK onshore and offshore territory and by UK companies overseas.

        • Require all public and private sector financial organisations to divest from companies whose main business is fossil fuel extraction within a 7-year period.

        • Source 100% energy from renewables by 2040.

        • Public ownership of energy and water companies to enable a planned, managed transition and to ensure that profits are neither diverted from the transition task nor act to distort priorities.

        • Require ‘Advanced’ insulation standards5 for new building stock.

        • Retrofit all building stock (insulation, heating) to an energy efficiency of at least 80% (bottom of band B) by 2035. For the housing stock this would be via devolved funding to local authorities on a secure, multi-year basis.

        • The removal of planning restrictions on renewable technology. Make it easier for communities and local organisations to invest and benefit financially from small scale local energy provision6. This has the added advantage that generation losses would be considerably lower than in the current centralised system (50-70%). In parallel, ensure the grid has the capacity to accept and balance renewable energy.

        • Make it a binding requirement for all public sector organisations and agencies – in relation to spending, programmes and projects (and that includes their procured and commissioned suppliers) – to reduce carbon emissions in relation to the headline target (the government aspiration of 68% reduction in carbon emissions on 1990 levels by 2030 and the Emergency Plan target of cessation of fossil fuel usage by 2035). There must be a regular reporting requirement on this obligation7.

  • Introduce multiple policies and actions as outlined here to enable and require a major shift in transport modes from high carbon private modes to low carbon and/or active modes. Reduce the demand to travel. A separate ‘Transport Act: Equitable Decarbonisation’ should be enacted to achieve this. Provisions would include:

  • No further road building.

  • Investment in railways and buses for long-distance travel, with an emphasis on rail electrification, reducing capacity bottlenecks, securing rail lines in the face of increasing climatic impacts, and bus networks to cover gaps in the system.

  • Demand reduction provisions, for example incentivising businesses to recruit locally resident staff, amendment to National Planning Policy to facilitate the retrofitting of city spatial patterns towards the 15 or 20 minute model.

  • Regulation and de-privatisation of bus networks in both urban and rural areas. Restoration of rural bus services and use of collective taxi options in areas where this is not feasible, as well as an increase in route coverage in towns.

  • Disincentivisation of private motor travel, ceasing production and import of ​​ cars powered by internal combustion engines, and introducing stringent limits to the power, size and mass of vehicles.

  • An overall reduction in freight, especially on roads. Facilitation of low carbon final mile deliveries.

  • Further investment in protected provision for walkers and wheelers, although this may become less necessary as the volume of private traffic and the freeing of space from cars increases, particularly in urban areas.

  • Curtailment of aviation. Possible immediate actions would be as follows:

  • Immediate moratorium on airport expansion.

  • Immediate embargo on domestic flights, where a journey by overland public transport would take 6 hours or less. There would be exemptions for emergency services and other exemptions could be considered (e.g. Scottish islands, and a different arrangement for Irish destinations).

  • Immediate introduction of VAT on aviation fuel and increases in Passenger Duty Levy.

  • Immediate enactment of a frequent flyer levy, chargeable after the first flight in a two-year period.

  • Zero aviation by 2050 except for emergency purposes (subject to status of global carbon budget and technology development) (Allwood et al., 2019).

  • International shipping would also be covered by a similar programme of reductions. However, there is some scope for the replacement of some fossil fuelled shipping with renewable power, including wind and wind-assisted ships. Nevertheless, overall shipping will need to reduce according to the overall decarbonisation programme, with impacts mitigated by import substitutions for essentials, where feasible.

 

Livelihoods: a social guarantee

We need a future in which people can lead safe and flourishing lives with basic needs fulfilled. Work will focus on addressing societal needs rather than the pursuit of profit and growth. Significant shifts in the type and geography of work will be needed to address climate change and the transition must be fair, where nobody is left behind, and good quality work is available for all who want it.

Why it’s important

If people are to thrive, not just survive, and live with dignity and personal and collective well-being, able to participate in and create a flourishing society, then their needs for a decent living standard must be met. We see this being done via a combination of reforms to work and incomes and through collective non-profit provision of fundamental services. People should be able to access stable and fulfilling work; be able to achieve positive work–life balances and live with dignity, agency and a sense of hope for the future.

Livelihoods for people and planet

Income

The UK is the second most unequal country in the world in terms of wealth inequalities (The Equality Trust, 2023). Whilst this inequality has been growing over three decades, it has increased rapidly since 2010.

Benefits have been squeezed and with the introduction of Universal Credit, rolling six benefits into one, has made poorer households even poorer. Timmins (2017) argues that:

‘The overall effect has been to plunge people already on low incomes into rent arrears and debt and in some cases homelessness. In others cases, it has caused job losses – the very opposite of what Universal Credit is intended to achieve.’

Hirsch (2024) notes that,

‘The UK benefits system has always had its shortcomings, with benefit rates that are not related to evidence of need, serious obstacles and delays in administration and some people falling through the net of income protection that it seeks to provide. But today, all these features have become so pervasive that benefits are falling woefully and systematically short of protecting citizens against hard times.’

The government’s withdrawal of Child Benefit from families with more than two children has increased household poverty and as childcare costs continue to rise, these households are pushed to the brink of destitution. Many have gone over the brink and destitution is now widespread. This most severe form of hardship, where people cannot afford to meet the most basic physical needs to be warm, dry, clean and fed, was experienced in the UK by around 3.8 million people in 2022. Around 1 million of them were children. The number of destitute people has doubled since 2017 (Schmuecker & Bestwick, 2023).

The oft-cited adage ‘the way out of poverty is through work’ no longer holds true, and it is no longer the case that pushing people into work helps them out of poverty. In-work poverty, caused in part by ​​ Conservative governments’ austerity programme, fuelled by the cost-of-living crisis, is experienced by many who must supplement their income with Universal Credit. From 2017 to 2022 the poverty rate for England was 22%, Scotland 19%, Wales 23% and Northern Ireland 18% (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2022).

Furthermore, the number of low paid jobs and precarious working situations in the so-called gig economy has led to a swathe of low paid, usually non-unionised, workers, unable to afford basic necessities of housing or food, sometimes working in the hidden economy and unable to claim benefits – the precariat (Standing, 2011). Despite a light raising of the minimum wage, in-work poverty as a result of low paid work has grown.

Research by Loughborough University has shown that by 2021, over 29.1% of individuals were living in households below the Minimum Income Standards which means:

‘19.2 million people do not have the income required to live with dignity in the UK: they are unable to afford the goods and services the public think you need to meet both material needs and participate in society.’ (Padley & Stone, 2023)

The current system of income support is clearly inadequate. Furthermore, based as it is on means testing, with long periods of delay built in to the decision making, it destroys people’s dignity and sense of agency and the last decade of austerity has made things worse (McGrath et al., 2016).

Whilst poverty and destitution has increased, so too has extreme wealth. Disparity in income is associated with other social ills, including increased health inequality, increased crime, and decreased social trust (De Courson & Nettle, 2021; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009).

There is clearly a need to raise the income levels of the least well off and lower the income levels of the wealthiest. One way to do the former is to provide a guaranteed minimum income – possibly via taxation or via allocation of a basic income, ‘a periodic cash payment unconditionally delivered to all on an individual basis, without means-test or work requirement’ (Torry, 2020). At the same time there should be a cap on higher incomes. A public opinion survey, across demographic groups and over more than 40 countries, indicated a widespread belief that there should be no more than a 1:5 ratio between the best and worst paid employees (Kiatpongsan & Norton, 2014, p. 594).

  • Guaranteed minimum income and capped maximum income (also see taxation). Specifically, establish an incomes policy with guaranteed minimum and (at first) indicative maximum. Set a maximum income in the public sector and a maximum pay ratio, initially set at 1:15 but reducing over time to 1:5.

There are other possible ways of achieving this, for example, via a basic income whilst ensuring nobody is worse off and whilst maintaining universal services (see the section on Services); or options such as a participation income (Atkinson, 1996), a guaranteed land income (Casal Lodeiro, 2021), the participatory economy (Kagan, 2019a, 2021) or negative income tax (see taxation section). The universal principle avoids the problems of means testing (exclusion of people who don’t make a claim and the stigma of being a claimant) but would likely be too costly, unless there were a mechanism to recoup money from those on higher incomes. This could be done automatically through taxation – by means of an adjustment to personal allowances, so that effectively anyone with income above a certain level would not gain from the universal payment. We do not have a fixed view on the best approach so long as the principle of a guaranteed basic income level is achieved for all.

Work

Paid work and occupation have the potential to contribute to fulfilling lives and to the meeting of social needs, as well as being a source of income for workers and households. However, minimum income levels should not depend on work alone (see above). Employment and workplaces are changing rapidly and will continue to do so as more automation is brought in and work is geared towards a green economy. Some fantasists have argued that there is unlikely to be enough work for everyone, as a source of income (Srnicek & Williams, 2016). Conversely, other commentators suggest that in a low energy future, there could actually be more manual work (Casal Lodeiro, 2016). Either way, work will still be necessary for its social benefit and as an important source of identity.

In the future there will need to be a better balance between paid work, domestic work, unpaid work and leisure. Already, experiments with shorter working weeks have been shown to benefit the well-being of workers and the effectiveness of the organisation (Chung, 2022). Furthermore, shorter working weeks would give people more time to contribute to community solidarity via voluntary or community work, currently the province of more women than men and many more retired than working age people (Kagan, 2018a). Given the ecological and planetary crisis, aggregate resource consumption needs to decrease. It is essential that those whose jobs pay less are protected from the impacts of an associated loss of employment income, a question we address elsewhere.

  • Shorter working hours including a shorter working week with no loss of capacity to meet fundamental needs.

Experience during the pandemic has shown, once and for all, that more flexible working arrangements benefit both women and men with family commitments (Adamson et al., 2023), although flexible working requests prior to this were made more often by women than by men.

  • Ensure that flexible working arrangements, in terms of hours and places of work, are available and taken up by men and women.

Flexible working is not the only issue connected to workplaces. If travel is to be cut down, then more workplaces will need to be local. Some of these could, of course, be in people’s homes, but it will be essential that workspaces, and work hubs are made available in each locality, thereby saving travel time and the carbon costs of travel, and also contributing to vibrant and viable (20 minute) neighbourhoods (Steady State Manchester, 2019). As the nature of high streets changes, flexible, local workspaces will make use of vacant and re-purposed buildings, helping to ensure that neighbourhoods retain their vitality (Leap 00, 2021 sic).

  • Work with developers to provide flexible workspaces and work hubs, including co-working spaces, in each locality, within a 20-minute walk or cycle from people’s homes.

Whilst jobs in manufacturing have diminished, and many in services have already been automated, there is a huge social need for growth in labour-intensive sectors such as care, education and public services, and for a shift toward local and sustainable jobs, geared to local needs.

  • Recognise and properly remunerate local and public service jobs by funding local authorities as the preferred provider and commissioner of these jobs.

If local jobs are created by the people who live in the area, they are more likely to meet the needs of that area8. We have seen a growth in the civil or participatory economy (00:/, 2011 sic) wherein local people come together to create work and enterprises that are relevant, building social solidarity in the process (Kagan, 2019b). These are often new jobs in cooperatives which would have the advantage of increased worker democracy and social solidarity (Novkovic & Webb, 2014).

  • Stimulate the growth of worker cooperatives and other forms of cooperatives.

Cooperatives and other co-created enterprises will need to be supported, particularly in the early days (Participatory City Foundation, 2023).

  • Provide resources to local areas for the growth of jobs designed by local people for local communities and thereby grow the participatory economy.

The manufacturing and service sectors that will have to grow in the near to long term future are the so-called green jobs. These are jobs that serve to meet the challenge of climate change, building the infrastructure needed to both mitigate against and adapt to climate change, including, for example, in energy, transport and housing, care and social services, ecological restoration and biodiversity conservation, forestry, and sustainable agricultural production. We have seen that in many of these areas, work is currently done on a voluntary basis, outside the market. It will be up to the government, possibly in partnership with the private sector, to provide these jobs. One way to ensure these jobs exist, whilst at the same time providing adequate incomes, is through the introduction of a job guarantee (TUC, 2020), in this case a green job guarantee. A green job guarantee might provide full and productive work for citizens of working age, including both new entrants and trainees (one of the UN Sustainable Development Goals), and offer remuneration at least at the Living Wage level (Tcherneva, 2020). However, it does rely on the State deciding which activities are eligible, which could intensify the commodification of work, whereby voluntary and community activities become remunerated employment.

  • Utilise taxes on fossil fuel companies to fund the establishment of ‘green jobs’.

  • Develop a programme of retraining workers from industries that rely on fossil fuels to work in the green jobs sectors.

Moving from an individualistic society where many people work for maximum personal and financial gain to one that equally values community building and solidarity, coupled with a change in working hours to provide more time for non-paid work, means that there can be a growth of and a broadening of those involved in voluntary work. Voluntary work, however, does not just happen, it needs to be supported, both financially and by skilled community development workers (Kagan, 2008).

  • Invest in training and resources for community development.

Changes in the patterns of work suggested here mean a realignment of time and priorities, between paid work and family, between paid and unpaid work, and between men and women (Büchs & Koch, 2017; Kagan, 2018b). The changes would lead to more fulfilling lives, oriented around enhancing community solidarity, and health and well-being, not financial gain and private profit (Gough, 2017).

  • Devise a programme of social development with individual and community health and well-being at its core to increase participation in voluntary and community activity.

Cost of living

Given the necessary and chosen collective frugality in response to the ecological and climate crisis, there will be reasonable concern about the cost of living for households. Will the policies in this document impoverish everyone, and the poorer sectors in particular? We can respond to that challenge in three linked ways. Firstly, we can identify ways in which people will be supported in meeting the costs of living with comfort and dignity (each of the following measures is reflected in one or more of our policy recommendations). Secondly, our overall thrust is to restructure the economy to make sustainability cheaper for households, to redistribute resources, and to shift the burden to polluters and those who are best off, so the transition is a collective endeavour. Thirdly, and perhaps less tangible immediately, the new national project will also entail rethinking what we value and what we need. That does not mean poverty, it means better, simpler living (Hickel, 2022; Odum & Odum, 2001; Trainer & Alexander, 2019).

Summary of measures that will ameliorate the cost of living

  • More reliance on collective means of meeting needs, for example, good public transport rather than private motors, neighbourhood tool libraries rather than every home possessing an electric drill, and of course the full range of essential public services. Altogether this means ‘public luxury and private sufficiency’ (Ivanova & Büchs, 2023; Monbiot, 2017).

  • A floor of guaranteed income and services (Button & Coote, 2021; Coote, 2023; Liegey & Nelson, 2020), for example, ‘health care and education… housing, public transit, energy, water, Internet, child care, recreation facilities, and nutritious food for all’ (Hickel, 2023).

  • A progressive, redistributive tax system.

  • Housing reform to end speculation driven price inflation and to control rents.

  • A retrofit programme for housing that will ensure warmth with far less ongoing expenditure.

  • Job redesign and job creation in the ‘replacement economy’.

  • A reduction in working hours allowing for supplementation of diet through cultivation, mending and re-making things, at both household and community level, slower and cheaper travel.

  • Reduction in advertising and marketing to reduce the pressure to spend for status goods: as the reforms consolidate, people will increasingly find identity and self-worth through non-monetary means.

  • Increased availability of options for repair and re-use, with controls on built-in obsolescence.

  • Price controls on things like utilities and basic foodstuffs.

This is tantamount to a complete redesign of the economy so that it does not rely on endless growth to deliver prosperity to the citizens, a far better way for the country and the people within it to live (Hickel, 2022).

Production, consumption and food

The arrangements for provisioning our population need to change radically in line with the depth of the crises that confront us. Production needs to be primarily for need and consumption moderated by the principle of sufficiency. Reliance on, and exploitation of, other lands and peoples to meet our needs and wishes must be drastically reduced to ensure security of provisioning and the reduction of environmental harm.

Why it’s important

‘What is clear is that, for all countries, a rapid response to climate change demands a fundamental reallocation of that society’s productive capacity, its labour and resources. Three decades of failure have removed any wriggle room.’ (Anderson, 2023)

Over the last four decades the provisioning of the UK population has changed radically.

Food production and consumption

In 2020, the UK imported 46% of the food it consumed, according to UKFSR, DEFRA’s United Kingdom Food Security Report 2021 (Department for Food, Environment and Rural Affairs, 2023a). However, this government metric is misleading since imported ingredients that are then processed into foodstuffs in the UK are counted as home produced. HSBC’s David McCarthy estimated that the true figure was closer to 80% (quoted by J. Edwards, 2019). To use a different statistic,

‘The Food Production to Supply Ratio (commonly referred to as the “Self Sufficiency Ratio”), is calculated as the farm-gate value of raw food production divided by the value of raw food for human consumption, and is estimated to be 60% for all food in 2022 and 73% of indigenous type food.’

However, this has fallen from a high of 94% and 78% in 1984 (Department for Food, Environment and Rural Affairs, 2023b). As Lang (2022) notes,

‘A long list of ecological and social risks can be derived from UKFSR9: pollinator decline, weather extremes, over-fishing, fertiliser disruptions (particularly phosphates), soil depletion, seasonal worker shortages, price uncertainties, unmet need, a population with poor diet-related ill-health, and more.’

We would add the impact of all those imports on carbon emissions (while recognising that local production is not inevitably lower in emissions), as well as the ecological cost of the industrial agriculture model that produces much of that food, an ecologically destructive and risky mode of production that we also have in the UK.

As the climate crisis and ecological overshoot get worse, it is likely that the effect will be felt most acutely in the form of food shortages. Since the UK currently imports so much of its food and exports far less, it is vulnerable as traditional food growing regions start to struggle to produce food in the same quantities as before and are likely to be forced to favour local consumption over exporting. Writers such as Chris Smaje (2020) have calculated that even allowing the UK population to grow to 83 million and leaving 45% of the land for non-food uses (largely managed woodland), the UK could feed itself. This would require moving back to a system of food production based on labour-intensive small farms producing much less meat and dairy and much more cereals, fruit and vegetables than at present. Moreover, the end of concentrated, readily deployable fuel in quantity (fossil fuels) would present a challenge for food production (Bradford, 2019). This may mean, firstly, a greater requirement for human labour, and secondly, the need to re-localise as much production as possible within each region – as envisaged, for example, in the Liège Food Belt or in the urban agriculture initiatives in Latin America (Borowy, 2010; Otman, 2020). This highlights the importance of food and the rural economy in relation to the big centres of population. ​​ This is bioregional thinking (Desai & Riddlestone, 2007; James & Cato, 2014; Sale, 1985) whereby planning units include the rural hinterland of cities and assure the protection of peri- and inner urban green spaces. It is likely that some 15% of all work could be in producing food. Money spent on food would represent a much higher percentage of people’s spending; this would need to be ‘paid for’ through the reductions in other types of consumption outlined elsewhere in this document. Whilst much of the production would be undertaken by small farms using agro-ecological principles (Soil Association, n.d.), a significant share of production could also be expected to come from home gardeners with all the attendant benefits that would come from a more direct relationship between people and their food. Institutional reforms will be needed to enable the transformation of the food system so that people may be provisioned, with minimal waste, with food that is healthy and affordable without an unacceptable ecological cost (European Commission, 2021; IPES-Food & ETC Group, 2021).

  • Establish a robust strategy for food security, taking account of ecological and geopolitical supply chain shocks, and threats to UK food production, including climatic and ecological ones.

  • Address the economic and land tenure pressures facing small food producers, including farmers and horticulturalists, and encourage cooperative food growing and distribution networks in urban centres.

These two last actions will probably require binding legislation. Note that some of this food production would be outside the money economy and offer a ‘subsistence subsidy’ offsetting prices and price inflation elsewhere (Mies & Bennholdt-Thomsen, 1999).

Manufacturing

In manufacturing, there has been a major decline in UK produced goods over the last 40 years.

‘When Thatcher came to power, manufacturing accounted for almost 30% of Britain’s national income and employed 6.8 million people. By the time Brown left Downing Street [in 2010], it was down to just over 11% of the economy, with a workforce of 2.5 million.’ (Chakrabortty, 2011)

As we know, that was devastating for most of industrial Britain, as livelihoods disappeared. The substitution of manufacturing has been overseas, much of it in China and India. While UK industry was often highly polluting, there are severe consequences from importing so much.

The price of imported goods is, overall, artificially low. This is due to the lower wages in the Global South, leading to value capture by the economies of the north, like the UK (Hickel, Dorninger, et al., 2022; Smith, 2012, 2016). This means that, although labour’s share of GDP has fallen here, consumer goods are still incredibly cheap. That, together with an enormous sales and marketing industry, has meant an explosion of consumerism, where much of what is purchased is treated as ephemeral, disposable, replaceable. Such unbridled consumerism, whether of out of season asparagus from Peru, cheap shirts from Bangladesh, or huge televisions from Malaysia, is extremely damaging to the environment, at every stage of the chain from extraction and production, via distribution, to eventual disposal and waste. It is not a world that can continue, nor one that we should want to.

  • Establish strategies for re-shoring production for need wherever possible.

Re-shoring will require government subsidy during establishment of industries. Those industries must be as near zero carbon as possible: if emissions are going to be substantial, then either an alternative approach is required, or the industry should not be established. The priority throughout will be production for need. Note that some of this re-shoring would provide job openings for workers displaced from those industries that can no longer be afforded ecologically. It will be essential to safeguard and improve livelihoods in low income supplier countries during and after this re-shoring process.

Fashion/textiles

The fashion industry is particularly problematic. Not only have we outsourced much of the manufacture to low income, low waged economies, but the industry as a whole is highly polluting and is responsible for between 1–3% of global carbon emissions, or something over 1 billion tonnes of CO2, (Peters et al., 2021; Sadowski et al., 2021)10. Indeed,

‘when factoring in the entire lifecycle of a garment, from manufacturing to transportation to, ultimately, ending up in landfill, in total, 1.2 billion tonnes of carbon emissions are released by the fashion industry every year.’ (Richards, 2021)

Not all garments end up in landfill: there is a profitable trade in shipping used garments from the UK to low income countries, which then undermines local garment production. Ghana, for example, imports about 15 million items of second-hand clothing each week – not all, but much of it from the UK (Johnson, 2023). A just transition, to a more sustainable, non-exploitative fashion industry, requires several things: a change in the popular mindset and incentives in favour of reducing and re-using garments; the manufacture and consumption of clothes that last; a reduction in cheap, fast fashion that is used very few times; a change from polyester fibre which sheds microfibres and is a fossil fuel by-product; investment in low income manufacturing countries to encourage the use of renewable energy and to shift to the manufacture of socially useful goods; a strategy for reducing the amount of clothing that is sent to low income countries whilst encouraging investment in home manufacture of clothing. (For a relevant framework, see Hoskins, 2023).

  • Introduce a vigorous public information campaign about the climate impact of (fast) fashion – there will be no behaviour change without information.

  • Phase out polyester clothing through a mixture of public information, import taxes and incentives for source manufacturers to change their practices to produce sustainable and non-polluting fibres.

  • Invest in low income countries manufacturing garments to help them change to renewable energy and low impact textiles while securing a living wage for all textile workers.

 

Human services and housing fit for an uncertain future

We need human services that place the people served at the centre, without the profit motive, to ensure positive well-being and a healthy, resilient society. There must be a complete change in the way housing is created and allocated so that people’s needs for security are met, in ways that nurture inclusive, convivial and resilient communities that sit lightly on the planet.

Why it’s important

Effective human services will be particularly important during the major societal transformation envisaged here. Over the last four decades, the UK’s welfare state has been subject to marketisation, privatisation, cuts and, too often, ill-suited managerialism. The social security safety net is no longer fit for purpose. All this has occurred while the demands on the welfare system have increased due to an ageing of the population, new pathologies and illnesses, and the need to equip citizens with skills and knowledge needed for a changing and challenging future. People are unable to thrive without secure and good quality housing. The design and siting of housing both influence carbon emissions and also shape local communities and the behaviours of people within them. The rising cost of housing is a major driver of poverty and destitution in the UK.

Health, care and support, education

Public services enable individual and community well-being and are key to a thriving society – at the heart of which is care for, care about and care of people and things. Care, as a unifying concept for public service and a viable future is also at the heart of feminist calls for climate interventions (Dengler & Lang, 2022). We see the need for a dual process of restoration and innovation. Restoration means a re-valuing and resurrection of public service, close to the Beveridge-Bevan ideals of the mid-twentieth century welfare state. Innovation means equipping the human services to meet the multiple needs of a population under stress, with resources that are constrained, not due to an ideology of rolling back the state, but due to the material constraints of a post-growth economy in a beleaguered world. While the expansion of the welfare state was reliant on economic growth, itself resting on neocolonial extraction (Ajl, 2021; Bhambra, 2022; Bhambra & Holmwood, 2018), even in a constrained world it can still be a political choice to prioritise human welfare and human services (E. Morris, 2014). A major flaw of the post-war welfare state was a bureaucratic paternalism, which raised the question of how best to fuse professional expert knowledge with the lived experience, knowledge and preferences of those served. The market ‘solution’, replacement of state and local government-run provision with largely private sector provision, brought no improvement.

Privatised services suck resources from the service system to feed shareholder profits. This, along with austerity policies since 2010, has starved public services of funds, contributing to the underfunding of service infrastructure and staffing across many different sectors, including health, social care and education. The lack of capacity for unforeseen events and for quality enhancing practices (training, proper hand-overs, reflection and service development) has been one result, exacerbated by a managerialist pursuit of ‘efficiency’, narrowly defined.

Our proposals are not detailed but are based on experience, evidence and best guesses about future needs (Burton, 2021; Butler, 2016; Coote, 2014; Costello et al., 2009; Illich, 1973; Kaufmann et al., 2019; Lister, 2005; Mayo, 1999; N.E.S.S., 2011; Oung, 2022; Rayner & Lang, 2012; Stark Murray, 1971; The Labour Party, 2019; Tudor Hart, 2006; Williams, 1989). The UK government should,

  • In the short term, place a levy on private sector providers to pay back some of the costs of staff training incurred by the public purse, on which they rely.

  • Stop the privatisation of human services, returning social care and education to local government management with an adequate financial settlement to meet present and emerging needs.

  • End the commissioner–provider split in health services, with all services returning to integrated management under a local elected board, closely linked to the local council11.

Health and well-being have multiple determinants, including the food we eat, the air we breathe, our homes, amenities and the extent to which we are enabled to grow and act with good information as citizens. Furthermore, the degree of wealth inequality found in the UK is associated with mental ill-health (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2019) and one way of addressing it is via progressive taxation (see section on taxation). The government has a role to play in promoting measures that prevent poor health and support well-being, only some of which naturally fall under the purview of the NHS and social services. These would include ensuring an effective social safety net, good local public health measures, secure and good quality housing, a vibrant cultural life, lifelong education and so on. It makes no sense to separate social care from health care – care for citizens should be the unifying rationale, irrespective of ability to pay. A properly funded health and care system would appropriately reward staff and be founded on good quality training. At the moment there is a dependence on overseas-born staff in both the health and care systems, many of them from the Global South, where, in many places, human services were devastated by Structural Adjustment Programmes and national indebtedness. Those workers’ families depend on remittances from work here. There is a complex relationship between recruitment, migration and immigration policies, that has led to the exploitation of skilled and unskilled workers and the break-up of families. Future services in the UK must not continue to exploit the Global South, whilst at the same time compensation will need to be paid for the ransacking of expertise and the need for remittances to home countries.

  • Develop an explicit and monitored cross-departmental strategy for supporting preventative health and well-being approaches to health.

At present, some conditions (e.g. cancer) primarily lead to free care within the NHS, while others (e.g. dementia) primarily occasion means-tested social care. This arbitrary, discriminatory (and specifically British) system should be reformed.

  • Place social care under the same tax-funded model, free at the point of delivery, as the NHS and school-age education.

Social disadvantage is one of the predictors of long term deterioration in health and capacity to play a full part in society. This starts early in childhood. The Sure Start programme of the last Labour administration had demonstrable effects in reducing early childhood inequalities. Good quality childcare, free to all who want it, supports households – particularly mothers who would otherwise have to retire from the labour market whether they wanted to or not. Only the rich currently have the luxury to choose. In January 2023, Shelter reported that there were at least 123,000 children homeless in England, many living in temporary accommodation (Shelter, 2023a). Free childcare, not dependent upon a permanent address would go some way to supporting those children, but is no substitute for a secure home (see the section on housing).

  • Free universal and properly resourced pre-school childcare for those that want or need it. This is a vital means of mitigating social disadvantage and inequalities. Restoration of Sure Start resources lost under austerity.

The future we are heading for will require citizens to be flexible and adaptable to rapidly changing circumstances. This may mean that knowledge and skills will need to be constantly updated and that lifelong learning needs to be made a reality. The National Curriculum as it stands, with its relatively recent emphasis on academic subjects and rote learning, will not prepare students for collaborative problem solving or foster the imagination and practical capabilities needed for an uncertain future (Harris, 2016).

  • Rebalance education to prepare children and young people for a fulfilling life in an ecologically constrained world: practical skills, cultural education and practice, as well as high quality education in science, appropriate technology, and the humanities.

  • Invest fully in post-16 and lifelong education and in the cultural life of communities, facilitating creative talents and cultural appreciation for all citizens.

It is recognised that these proposals have costs, which will be a challenge in the context of managed economic contraction. However, the fundamental importance of social support and the care-giving function in society means that these areas take absolute priority over things like tax cuts and defence. It is a government choice where to spend (or not).

A housing future for people and planet

Why it’s important

Home is fundamental: it is the basis for our development as human beings, capable of contributing to society while benefiting from it. Yet for many, homes are expensive, uncomfortable, cold or unavailable. Thousands of children are growing up in inadequate housing, which makes it extremely difficult for families to provide a secure base for their growth and maturation. Moreover, what housing there is inflicts damage on the ecosystem that sustains us all (for example, about a third of territorial carbon emissions come from housing). This situation is the result of policy choices that have imposed market models and profit maximisation on what is fundamentally a human right and social good: initial strong progress on improving the carbon impact of housing has also fallen to the same policy choices.

The existing housing stock is inadequate in terms of quantity, distribution, tenure, design and quality. Poor quality housing causes or exacerbates health and mental health problems with costs to individuals, employers and the health service. As of January 2023, ​​ there were 123,000 children out of a total of 271,000 people who were homeless, many living in temporary accommodation (Shelter, 2023a) . The private rental sector is contracting with no fault evictions increasing as landlords move to AirBnB rentals or sell up their now unaffordable assets.

  • Progressively transform housing so that it maximises social benefits and minimises ecological impact (see table, and more detailed illustrative policy in Appendix 2).

Summary of housing proposals

Category

Proposals

Physical

Minimise the ecological and carbon footprint of buildings by changes to building regulations, National Planning Policy Framework and the creation of an independent body to assess and advise on building materials.

  • See also sections on energy.

Only very exceptionally build new on greenfield sites. Restore and build on formerly used (brownfield) land in urban areas and implement ‘gentle densification’ of up to 4 stories in suburban areas.

Insulate new housing to the highest possible standards, with residual heating using the lowest energy and carbon option. Maximise use of free energy.

Design buildings and settlements to provide access to work, schools, shops and leisure without the use of private cars: limit parking provision to disincentivise car use.

An ambitious new programme to urgently retrofit insulation to existing buildings. Provide incentives for owners, including landlords, to improve insulation.

Housing and community

Design and re-design housing and settlements to promote interaction, conviviality and solidarity, sharing of resources, and where desired, cooperative and communal living.

Facilitate local strategies to safeguard the availability of affordable housing for residents, e.g. residence requirements on new build and for public service jobs, double council tax on holiday lets.

Housing supply and demand

End the Right to Buy social housing, so preserving the remaining stock.

Remove financial and economic incentives for land speculation and ensure that levies on new developments are always applied (e.g. by removing the financial viability caveats).

Implement rent controls, unfreeze Local Housing allowances and increase them in line with local property rental prices; immediately revoke the bedroom tax on social housing tenants.

Allow councils to take control of properties that have not been occupied for over a year.

Increase the share of housing controlled by the not-for-profit sector.

Require councils to monitor standards of rented properties, with the necessary powers to intervene.

Ensure all new homes are accessible and adaptable, enabling occupants to remain in their houses for as long as they want.

 

  • More detail on housing policy, with illustrative policy proposals, can be found in Appendix 2: A Housing Future for People and Planet.

 

Economic and financial governance (macroeconomic policy, taxation, financial institutions and practices, business)

Macroeconomic policy

The government should have the obligation to ensure that there is sufficient money in the economy to direct resources efficiently towards caring for the earth and providing people with a decent livelihood. Fiscal instruments should prevent the accumulation of money beyond that required for a decent livelihood, recognising the continuing possibility of situations that result in excessive profits.

Current policy emphasises the tight management and reduction of government debt, while paying little attention to other types of debt, mushrooming household debt, for example. The government will need to borrow to fund elements of the transformation that is needed in the structure and functioning of the economy (e.g. expanding clean energy, managing the consequences of the contraction of dirty sectors and the overall economy). Borrowing also smooths the demand on taxation and allows response to the inevitable crises (Wren-Lewis, 2023). We suggest that there should be a ceiling on government debt but that needs setting on a medium to long term basis12. We do not accept the popular and simplistic argument that the government can just create money ‘by spending it into existence’ without constraints (which confuses money with economic value). While the government can create money in this way, to do so detached from the ability of the national economy to back the value of the money would be asking for trouble, particularly in an increasingly beleaguered and declining economy like the UK one (Meadway, 2019; Roberts, 2019; the more nuanced advocates of Modern Monetary Theory acknowledge this, e.g. Olk et al., 2023). We also note that the ‘traditional’ Keynesian approach of stimulating demand through government investment will hit the very real problems of supply shocks and the need to constrain gross economic activity due to carbon budgets and to avoid or reduce the overstepping of other ecological limits. That means alternative ways of funding the transition and of macroeconomic management will be needed (Michell, 2023). However, the judicious use of borrowing, although increasing medium to long term government debt, is a sound way to finance much of the necessary transformative investment (Wren-Lewis, 2024).

Tax

We need to transform taxation towards a system that, progressively, taxes the use of energy and resources, wealth, property and land value, taking into account the falling government revenue (other things being equal) from managed economic contraction.

Why it’s important

We can use taxation to do five main things to help bring about what we are proposing. We can use taxation,

1) to reduce environmental damage and increase protections.

2) as a way of reducing economic inequalities.

3) for macroeconomic management of the economy as a whole.

4) to help secure adequate funds for government spending.

5) to control the accumulation of surplus (profits) and power by large commercial organisations.

Our proposals make a start on these things. We do note that as the shape and size of the economy changes, both as a result of the changes proposed in this report and due to the imposition of planetary and ecological constraints on economic activity, the yield from taxes will change over time, often in a downwards direction.

Better taxes, for people and planet

We need effective taxes on wealth, a land tax, a much more progressive income tax, and greater levels of corporation tax. Taxes on expenditure should differentially fall on those most able to contribute, such as high VAT levels on luxury/high carbon goods and services but not on the things people require for their everyday needs. To incentivise production and consumption that reduces or minimises environmental harm, there should be preferential tax rates for labour-intensive, low impact, services and goods. The imperative for a fairer and more redistributive tax system will be greater under conditions of managed contraction of material flows: the argument that everyone will benefit from a growing cake will no longer be tenable, since the cake will not be growing. Redistribution is back!

  • Establish a programme to make the UK tax system much more redistributive.

  • The following actions identify some parameters and steps to take in the short to medium term. More detail, including illustrative policy proposals, can be found in Appendix 3: Reforming taxation, for people and planet.

Summary of tax proposals

Category

Proposals

Wealth

Wealth tax established in the mid-term.

Dividends and interest

Tax at the same rate as other income. Abolish the tax-free band for dividends and that for savings above £45k income.

Capital Gains

Align Capital Gains Tax with income tax and equalise residential and non-residential rates.

Inheritance tax

Halve the tax-free band and review the other exemptions.

Unrealised (sitting) assets

Consider a new tax.

Land

Introduce a Land Value Tax with appropriate exemptions.

Council tax

Re-band and adjust the relative council tax rates on a progressive size basis. Compensate councils receiving lower per capita council tax income.

Business rates

Increase to 25% with a higher band for the most profitable, larger companies.
Introduce a 10% band for companies with small profits.

Pensions

Abolish higher rate relief on pension contributions.

Goods and services

Restructure more equitably. Tax goods and services according to their carbon and water footprint. Tax imports according to their embodied carbon.

Transport taxes

Penalise large and heavy vehicles. Regulate leasing schemes to disincentivise frequent replacement.
From energy section: introduce VAT on aviation fuel and increase Passenger Duty Levy.

Income tax

Implement a truly progressive income tax settlement, effectively capping the highest incomes. People on lower and middle incomes will pay less or similar rates, respectively.

Tax avoidance

Reduce the number of legal options for avoiding tax and catch wealthy people evading payment.

  • For more detail, including illustrative policy proposals, see Appendix 3: Reforming taxation, for people and planet.

Public banking and access to financial institutions

We need to shift the financial system and its institutions from a mission to serve the interests of capital to serving the interests of people and planet.

Why it’s important

Any economy requires a sound financial system to facilitate its necessary transactions. Unfortunately, the system in the UK is dominated by financial institutions that serve the interests of their shareholders, which include other financial institutions, some of them being overseas companies. The scandal of the support of the fossil fuel and armaments industry, by the big banks, is one illustration of this central problem. The other problem is that the profits of these institutions are extracted from those who rely on them. There are other models available, but it will require government action beyond mere regulation to make that shift.

Community and alternative banking

There are attempts to fill a gap in the UK’s banking system, that of mutual or cooperative, regionally-based banks, orientated to the local economy and specialising in offering financial services to smaller enterprises, as well as local citizens. While these initiatives are admirable, they do not have the scale required to make the needed systemic changes.

If these and similar initiatives could be supported by legislation and government grants/cheap credit, they could be linked together to pool risks. They would be rooted in their communities, using local knowledge to make loans that those local economies and communities need. Rules would be established to regulate the setting of interest rates and to ensure the banks do not over-stretch themselves. These rules would be made locally but under national legislation to set the overall parameters. Credit would be quite cheap but not given out willy-nilly (there would be no shareholders who have to be paid on the basis of the ‘spread’ between deposits and loans). Bundling up of risky liabilities and speculative lending on housing would be prohibited.

Such financial institutions would look like a cross between mutual building societies and savings banks. They would make a profit but that would be returned to the community after necessary investment in the bank’s operations (e.g. opening a new branch, upgrading IT systems).

The government would play a part in the financing of appropriate economic activity by issuing a series of bonds. These would be a safe haven for savings and appear as public debt in the national accounts. They (and similar vehicles) would also be used by the local community banks to deposit money that they cannot immediately invest locally.

Throughout, perverse ‘growthogenic’ imperatives and speculation would have to be guarded against. The issuing of credit is not necessarily a generator of economic growth (Barrett, 2018; Berg et al., 2015; Cahen-Fourot & Lavoie, 2016; Jackson & Victor, 2015a, 2015b; Richters & Siemoneit, 2017; Svartzman et al., 2020). Only if it becomes the central means of creating profits (Lapavitsas, 2013) would it appear to have that effect. However, the need to pay interest on credit encourages the pursuit of growth throughout the economy, hence the need for controls on interest rates and the issuing of credit.

Not all the necessary features are described here, but this sets out some key elements of a sound, responsible and safe banking system. See also Berry (2018).

  • Legislate to establish a strong public and community financial sector. Any remaining state-owned banking enterprises13 should be incorporated in it.

Insurance

Insurance is a problematic sector. At present, the market-based model of risk pooling, that elective insurance offers, means that insurance schemes accumulate money, becoming self-interested players in the financial markets, creating all kinds of distortions. In the future, there will be an increase both in premiums and uninsurable risks. The way forward is for the state to be the guarantor for risks that threaten livelihoods and safety and for the mutual and cooperative, i.e. non-profit sector to expand for elective insurance purposes. We have not drafted a policy recommendation at this stage but it is an area that needs further consideration.

Reform of business governance

In the future that we need, there will certainly be business enterprise, but it must function in the interests of the people and the planet and not merely chase profits for shareholders.

Why it’s important

We have the paradox of an abundant economy that routes wealth to the few. Meanwhile the spectre of severe want has returned to our society. Moreover, the pursuit of profitability in the shareholder interest, above all else, means that responsibility for the planet and to communities, at home and overseas, takes second place. This situation prevails despite the willingness of many companies, large and small, and the people within them, to act responsibly. The problem lies beyond personal or even corporate good-will, in the nature of capitalist accumulation and the legal licence that it has. The former isn’t going away in the short term, but the latter can be changed: some modest reforms to the rules for business governance could mitigate part of the problem. In the longer term the emphasis should be on decommodifying sectors and expanding the role of the commons, broadly conceived.

  • Amend the regulation of business so that Limited Liability status is a privilege, not a right, and would be removed from firms that are not delivering net social benefit.

  • Make elected worker and community representation on company boards mandatory.

  • Offer tax incentives for (re-)mutualisation.

  • Require public ownership of key industries and services. That would not mean mid-20th-century style nationalisation, although nationalisation is indeed one option. A variety of other forms of public ownership are available14.

 

Planning for resilience and democratic civil security

We need a future where citizens can count on structured and responsive help to both forestall and respond to emergencies caused by the ecological and climate collapse and increasing instability on the geopolitical environment.

Why it’s important

We are going to need help to ensure our communities and their provisioning systems can respond to the shocks that will inevitably impact on them. That means transforming the present defence and security services. Should there be a breakdown of provisioning systems, a real risk is an increase in criminal activity, even gangsterism and warlordism. For that reason there will need to be a public protection function to maintain order, but it must act in the common interest, under as much democratic control as possible.

Resilience

Resilience is the capacity of a system, community or individuals to absorb disturbance and reorganise while undergoing change, so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity and feedbacks. This depends on several dimensions including,

Diversity – the variation within the system. A field of one crop is more vulnerable to pest attack than a field of mixed crops.

Modularity – the extent to which the system is broken up into relatively autonomous subsystems. The banking crash of 2008 was exacerbated by the size and interdependence of financial institutions.

Tightness of feedbacks – the speed with which the system can respond to disturbance.

Preparing our communities and the systems they rely on will require attention to these principles and the variety of systemic threats that could arrive (Servigne & Stevens, 2020; Tainter, 1988). Plans must then be established accordingly.

  • Prepare a national resilience plan to safeguard communities and their provisioning systems. Mirror this, according to the principle of subsidiarity, at the local level.

There is already a public duty to assess the risk of civil emergencies occurring and to make plans for responding (UK Public General Acts, 2004). However, this is some way from establishing the kind of national and local resilience plans envisaged here.

A refocussing of defence spending and a reduction in military expenditure

‘The Ministry of Defence (MOD) – at least in its conservative official estimate which excludes most Scope 3 emissions – produced 3.13 million tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions in 2022-23.… The defence burden alone accounts for nearly half of the UK government’s emissions……
‘
Scientists for Global Responsibility estimated the total annual emissions of the MOD and its connected military industrial sector, including UK-based arms suppliers, UK-based arms exporters and related indirect employment at 6.5 million tonnes of CO2‚ double its estimate of MOD emissions alone…… If using a consumption-based approach to accounting for emissions … UK military spending produced 11 million tonnes of CO 2 equivalent in 2018. …
‘The UK is the sixth highest spending country on its military globally with a total expenditure of $68.5 billion
15 in 2022.’ (Bigger et al., 2023, pp. 12–14, 22)

UK defence expenditure should firstly be reduced from 2.2% of GDP to the European Union average of 1.6% (World Bank & Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, n.d.). The actual expenditure would decline further given the managed contracting scale of the economy as a whole. Moreover, the focus would shift from military expenditure to civil defence and civil works.

Refocussing the military on civil defence in response to climatic and other shocks

Some senior military leaders see climate change as an existential risk (e.g. Vergun, 2021). Re-allocating excessive military spending to resilience and remedying global inequalities (see next section) could help reduce that threat considerably, facilitating a virtuous circle of reduced expenditure on offensive hardware and its infrastructure. Just as in the hydrocarbon industry, there is a wealth of skills and knowledge in the defence sector (including logistics, engineering, risk and crisis management) that could be deployed for social and environmental benefit.

  • Closure of overseas bases. Decommissioning of military hardware, except that needed for a basic territorial defence function.

  • Establishment of a national civil works team – an alternative to military service that might be attractive to those currently going into the military.

  • Reform policing on the model of a democratically governed People’s Police Service, focussing on public protection and crime prevention in the face of systemic risks.

 

Climate justice and the Global South

The future we need is a globally equitable one, where the countries of the Global North16 (like the UK) recognise and pay their historic debts to the Global South. We must also ensure that consumption levels, climate adaptations and mitigations in the Global North do not further exploit and damage the Global South.

Why it’s important

Global inequity

Climate change, its adaptation and mitigation, is a global issue and it is widely recognised that economic and social developments in the Global North have been at the expense of the Global South, both in terms of labour exploitation and extraction of natural resources.

Historic emission data reveal that the Global North is responsible for 68% historic emissions (to 2015). However, if consumption-based emissions are taken into account, Hickel (2020) estimates the Global North is responsible for 92% of climate breakdown. This indicates that high income countries have a far greater degree of responsibility for climate damage than previously thought (Hickel, O’Neill, et al., 2022).

The UK has been ranked seventh for cumulative CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, land use and forestry between1850 and 2021 – about 3% of the global total. However, when countries’ colonial histories are taken into account, the UK is responsible for nearly twice as much warming as previously thought – some 5.1% of the global total, placing it fourth in ranking, behind the US, China and Russia but ahead of India, Brazil and Germany. Moreover, the UK’s population are the second-highest historical emitters on a per-capita basis, when accounting for emissions under colonial rule (Evans & Viisainen, 2023a, 2023b).

So the UK has a particular responsibility to address climate change in the Global South and make reparations for historical emissions due to its colonial and post-colonial past, including those linked to fossil fuels, cement, land use, land use change and forestry.

A future where the UK takes responsibility for the damage it has done

Climate reparations

  • The UK government should accept its responsibilities and identify and commit funding to former colonies, as reparation for emissions due to colonial rule to help them deal with current climate challenges.

Financial support for just and equitable transitions: climate adaptation and mitigation.

The countries of the North, (including the UK) have promised financial contributions to Global South countries for adaption and mitigation measures, but these have not been honoured, year by year (Ares & Loft, 2021).

Whilst the UK has been contributing to climate finance, including international finance, since 2011, this is not new money: most has been drawn from the existing aid budget – known as International Climate Finance. Many ICF projects overseen by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and its predecessor the Department for International Development (DFID) are only partly related to climate change, meaning they may also cover other issues, such as education and healthcare (Gabbatiss, 2023b). The UK may be the fifth largest national provider of climate finance over the last decade, but as of October 2023 there is still a substantial shortfall in pledged contributions from rich countries combined, including the UK. Furthermore, questions are asked as to whether the UK is paying its fair share (Gabbatiss, 2023a).

‘Climate finance is a highly politicised issue and developed countries are under intense pressure to deliver the money they have promised repeatedly to developing countries, and to spend it in ways that achieve the greatest impact. Specifically, they have a still-outstanding pledge to raise $100bn annually by 2020 and now must decide on a more ambitious goal by 2024. There are also questions around whether rich countries, including the UK, are paying their “fair share” based on their historic responsibility for climate change.’ (Gabbatiss, 2023b).

The Committee on Climate Change (2022) noted that the UK is set to increase its contributions to adaptation finance by 2025, based on 2019 levels, but as Carver (2023) confirms, these are to come from existing official development assistance budgets. Financing for climate transitions is clearly complex. The government, across four departments and using the 17 Key Performance Indicators, identifies all sorts of projects as being about climate mitigation or adaptation. The UK is also part of targeted initiatives, such as FAST, the Food and Agriculture for Sustainable Transformation initiative, FIP, the Forest Investment Programme, and the Clean Technology Fund.

In sum, to date, the UK government has claimed to provide substantial funds for climate mitigation and adaptation (U.K. Government, 2023). However, these are not new funds and the full commitments have not been made. Furthermore, the approach of the UK government is to argue that private finance should also contribute to climate finance, a stance taken in respect to Loss and Damage funding as well as previously allocated funds.

  • The UK must honour its commitment to contribute the promised funds to the green climate fund. It must allocate ring-fenced climate finance and honour existing financial commitments to the Global South for adaptation and mitigation of climate action.

Loss and damage fund

However, adaptation and mitigation are no longer enough. The Global South is already experiencing the damaging effects of climate breakdown. The idea of a fund to compensate for loss and damage was first proposed over three decades ago when Vanuatu and the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) called for an international insurance pool for sea level rise in 1991 (Kattamuri et al., 2022).

Agreement on this idea was finally reached at COP27 in 2022, when a specific fund for Loss and Damage was agreed. This aims to provide financial assistance to the countries that are most vulnerable and already impacted by the effects of climate breakdown.

‘Loss and Damage’ is ‘a term used to describe how climate change is already causing serious and, in many cases, irreversible impacts around the world – particularly in vulnerable communities’ (Dunne et al., 2022). They include extreme weather events and changes to precipitation that threaten food production and distribution; hunger and displacement due to drought; people and animals dying due to drought and communities devastated by floods; threats to food, to water, to infrastructure. A. Burton (2022) argues that ‘Loss and Damage’ falls short of the reparations that should be paid by countries that have historically contributed the most greenhouse gas emissions in order to right historic injustices, as well as prevent them happening again.

Contribution from savings on military expenditure to the global Loss and Damage Fund

In the section on resilience and civil security we proposed closing overseas bases and also severely reducing expenditure on military hardware. The savings from expenditure on overseas bases could be made available for the loss and damage fund.

  • Estimate costs/savings of proposals on shifting from an offensive posture to one focussed on resilience and civil security: make a proportion available for mitigating climate impacts in the Global South.

Debt and International Finance Organisations

The UK could also campaign for and facilitate the cancellation of the unpayable debts of low and middle income countries. Servicing these debts to the IMF, World Bank, and financial institutions of the Global North, is one driver of the push for continued and expanded fossil fuel exploration and extraction. The Colombian President, Gustavo Petro, in addition to backing the Fossil Fuel Non-proliferation Treaty, has proposed debt reduction in exchange for actions to protect nature, for example the rain forests of the tropical zone (Worland, 2023).

  • The UK must recognise and make good historic injustices in terms of climate finance, compensating those countries whose natural resources and/or labour fuelled UK industrial development.

  • The UK must publicise and implement a strategy to ensure that poorer countries do not suffer from damaging resource extraction or labour exploitation in pursuit of its own climate mitigation and net zero ambitions.

    • The UK could work for the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, so that they support ecological and social justice throughout the world, for example by dedicating the proceeds from a global tax on financial transactions (the ‘Tobin tax’) to where they are most needed.

    • Work for the cancellation of the unpayable debts of Global South countries, linked to ecological protection and climate mitigation measures.

  • These actions should start with dialogue with those stakeholder countries in the Global South.

As António Guterres said in his opening speech of COP27:

‘The deadly impacts of climate change are here and now. Loss and damage can no longer be swept under the rug. It is a moral imperative. It is a fundamental question of international solidarity – and climate justice.’ (United Nations, 2022)

Guterres specifically asked governments to tax the pandemic-driven windfall profits of fossil fuel companies and redirect the money, not only to people struggling with rising food and energy prices, but also to countries suffering loss and damage caused by the climate crisis.

  • Tax windfall profits of fossil fuel companies to contribute to funding for those countries most vulnerable to climate breakdown.

Our consumption of both goods and food relies heavily on the Global South. Furthermore, many climate mitigations and adaptations undertaken by the UK depend on mineral extraction and labour practices in Global South countries. The UK must take particular care to ensure that its own climate actions do not further damage and disadvantage the countries of the Global South, either in terms of labour practices or natural resource extraction. A commitment to a just transition requires the creation of decent jobs in both the formal and informal economies in the Global South. Labour strategies should be developed in partnership with relevant workers’ organisations in different countries (I.L.O., 2015).

  • Ensure that climate actions address the labour rights of citizens in the Global South and support the development of work that assists progress towards climate targets.

In addition, insofar as women are disproportionately affected by climate change and at the same time have the potential to lead on climate solutions, it is essential to mainstream gender considerations in the design and implementation of climate action (I.L.O., 2022).

  • Recognise the gender dimension to climate actions and develop women as leaders in climate actions in their own countries.

Furthermore, many climate mitigations and adaptations undertaken by the UK depend on mineral extraction and labour practices from Global South countries. The UK must take particular care to ensure that its own climate actions do not further damage and disadvantage the countries of the Global South, either in terms of labour practices or natural resource extraction. There must be no further exploitation of the Global South (U.N. News, 2023).

  • Climate actions taken by the UK must be able to demonstrate no damage to countries of the Global South.

 

Measuring success

We have not emphasised the measurement question so far. Calls for alternatives to the standard growthist policy approach have often over-emphasised the transformative power of changing the key indicator used to measure economic success (Burton, 2020). We are somewhat sceptical about this, since any real alternative is unlikely to produce a single statistic that could track economic, social and ecological success (Butt et al., 2023). However, the matter does need serious consideration and we recommend the development of a small set of indicators used together.

We commend two initiatives already in place in the United Kingdom, and one in Ireland, and suggest that they be considered, synthesised and enhanced, then adopted as binding legislation for the UK, providing a new framework for tracking the economic, social and ecological health of the country as responsible global citizen.

Existing government initiatives on measurement in these islands

Wales

The Well-being of Future Generations Act (2015) places a duty on public bodies (including the Welsh Government) to improve the environmental, economic, social and cultural well-being of Wales and protect the needs of future generations. The Future Generations Commissioner has a role that has changed Welsh policy on key issues such as road building (The Future Generations Commissioner for Wales, n.d.).

Scotland

The Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015 requires the Scottish Government to consult on the outcomes of its national well-being framework (called the National Performance Framework, NPF) every five years (Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015, n.d.).

Ireland

Ireland has established a Well-being Framework which, it is planned, will be utilised in a systematic way across government policymaking (Irish Government, 2021).

 

Appendix 1: What no Growth?

The problem

The way our economy is organised at present is unviable because it depends on endlessly growing in size to sustain itself and maintain a semblance of social stability. This growth, at a preferred three percent per year, is regarded as exponential, growing like compound interest. Three per cent per year would mean an economy that doubles in size every 27 years or increases eight-fold in an average Western lifetime. It is not surprising that critics of economic growth liken it to the pathological growth of a tumour, rather than healthy growth that reaches a natural limit.

This requirement for infinite growth is ecologically unviable: there is no evidence that it is possible for economic activity to be separated (decoupled) from the amount of energy and physical material moving through the global economy (Burton, 2016; Haberl et al., 2020; Parrique, et al., 2019; Schandl et al., 2016; Wiedenhofer et al., 2020; Wiedmann et al., 2015). It is therefore incompatible with the finite nature of the planet and the environmental resources which support human life, depending on the destruction of ecological abundance and the capture of value from regions of the majority world (Hickel, Dorninger, et al., 2022; Smith, 2012).

A further problem is that growth in the material economy, while often seen as necessary in order to alleviate poverty, has in recent times led to the concentration of wealth and thereby to increasing inequality (Roberts, 2017; Tcherneva, 2015; Woodward, 2015).

Apart from this ‘diseconomics of growth’ (Hodson, 1972), it is in any case questionable whether the continued expansion of the economy can be achieved and sustained. The phenomenon of ‘secular stagnation’, an inherent reduction of the capacity of the economies of the rich countries to grow, has been well documented in both the mainstream and the critical economics literature (Streeck, 2016; Summers, 2016). This has to do with the exhaustion of the sources of capitalist expansion, such as cheap labour sources, cheap energy and materials, limits to technical innovation and new markets, as well as the increased propensity of the ecosystem to ‘bite back’, for example through climatic shocks impacting on food production. If neither neoliberal nor Keynesian prescriptions can force growth at the level the mainstream consensus believes desirable, isn’t it time to abandon the aim and instead try another approach (Jackson, 2019)?

A viable alternative

An economy that is ecologically, socially, and indeed economically viable requires re-design to ensure economic activity is based on what is socially useful while restoring and maintaining ecological assets. The fudges of ‘good growth’ and ‘green growth’ are not sufficient; the viable economy (Burton et al., 2020) is only ecologically viable when it is able to function without growing in overall size. In fact, it is necessary to actually shrink the material flows of energy and resources flowing through the global economy, and that means shrinkage of its scale here in the UK too17.

The viable, degrowth, alternative is socially preferable. Real increases in productivity and technological improvements must be better shared as real improvements in quality of life. This includes reductions in working time and increasing opportunities to undertake activities that need not make a profit but have value for individuals and communities. Ecological economists have modelled these policy choices under post-growth scenarios and conclude that they are feasible (Jackson & Victor, 2016; Lange, 2018; Nieto et al., 2020; Victor, 2019).

 

Appendix 2: A Housing Future for People and Planet

The existing housing stock is inadequate in terms of quantity, distribution, tenure and quality. As such it creates and worsens health and social problems with the resulting costs to society. There is insufficient supply of affordable rented accommodation and tenants are vulnerable to rent rises and eviction. Improvements in the heat-tightness and energy efficiency of housing proceed at an unacceptably slow pace, nowhere near the level required to reduce emissions and energy costs. Our overall recommendation is to,

  • Progressively transform housing so that it maximises social benefits and minimises ecological impact (the following sections provide the detail).

Physical

Minimising the environmental impact of buildings can be achieved through progressive amendments to building regulations, the NPPF (National Planning Policy Framework) and the creation of a well funded independent body to assess building materials along the lines of the BRE (Building Research Establishment).

  • See the section on energy.

New build

New housing will only exceptionally be built on greenfield sites. There is scope for restoring and building on formerly used (brownfield) land in urban areas and for ‘gentle densification’ of up to 4 stories in suburban areas (Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, 2022; zu Ermgassen et al., 2022).

  • Insulate buildings to the highest possible standards, (Emergency Brake target: All new-builds to have rating of at least 92% (bottom of Band A, Röck et al., 2020, p. 5). Any residual heating requirement must be zero carbon capable (principally heat pumps, generally on a communal or district basis). Buildings should be sited to maximise solar gain and, where possible, local energy generation should be installed.

  • Manage rainwater and groundwater to minimise run-off, with rates within 5% of the pre-build rate. Rainwater should generally be collected and used on site.

  • Design buildings and settlements to provide access to work, schools, shops and leisure without the use of private cars: any parking provision should be limited to well below 1 per 5 housing units to disincentivise car use.

On some developments it may be appropriate to provide space for shared or hireable cars. Every residential unit should have cycle storage, including charging points for ebikes.

Retrofitting

An ambitious new programme is required to urgently retrofit insulation and ventilation to existing buildings, with effective monitoring of methods and materials to ensure that this does not create problems such as damp or fire risk. (The Emergency Brake target is for domestic buildings to have median energy efficiency rating of at least 80% (bottom of band B) by 2035).

  • On rental properties of less than 50m2 there should be a significantly lower rent cap until the property meets the new standards of insulation, given the higher energy costs.

Housing and community

A strong society offers resilience in crises such as Covid and extreme weather (Chapman, 2019). There is a growing demand for housing in various forms of communal living including co-housing and cooperatives. Existing housing stock is overwhelmingly designed for separate households. Communal and cooperative living can help to address social problems such as isolation and loneliness. It can provide an informal support network for families with children, disabled people or people with health problems. By sharing equipment such as washing machines and lawnmowers it can reduce demand for consumer goods and reduce the need for storage space in individual units. Attractive communal living may encourage older people to move out of three or four bedroom family homes into smaller units, reducing the existing distribution problem. However, people also want homes for life and there can be ways of enabling this while releasing capacity as the need for space reduces after children have left home.

  • Design all new buildings and settlements to promote, but not require, convivial social interaction.

  • Provide incentives for local partnerships between developers and community-led or cooperative housing groups.

In some areas second homes, or those bought as investments to be rented out, crowd out affordable housing for families, creating a shortage of workers.

  • Encourage local authorities to enforce primary residence conditions on new homes.

  • Encourage local authorities to charge maximum Council Tax permitted on holiday and periodically let properties.

Supply of housing

Since around 1980, when the Thatcher government introduced the Right to Buy and restricted council house building, private developers and housing associations have not increased their house building to completely compensate for the end of building by local authorities (G.L.A., 2015).

Perverse financial incentives create incentives for private developers to build slowly. Large developments have always been built in phases to maintain sale price but it appears that failure to build has become integral to the land speculation business model.

‘The performance of the largest housebuilders between 2010 and 2015 can be summarised as follows: for the biggest five firms, housing completions rose by 48 per cent, housebuilding revenue increased by 103 per cent, while housebuilding profit before tax (PBT) increased by 473 per cent, and end of year total profits increased by 484 per cent. In short, the rate of growth in profit is ten times the rate of increase in completions.’ (Archer & Cole, 2016)

Dorling (2014, p. 94) shows that land values in 2007 were 16 times their 1983 value. He states that builders hold planning consent for 400,000 units that have not been built (also see Colenutt, 2020). He links this to rising inequality as the rich invest in land, especially when stock returns are low, increasing the incentives for developers to hold land rather than building. There is a massive difference in the value of land designated as agricultural and land with planning consent. Currently, a small proportion of this gain is captured via section 106 and the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL).

  • End the Right to Buy social housing.

  • Amend the National Planning Policy Framework to remove the ‘financial viability’ clause, and ensure section 106 and CIL are always imposed.

Demand for housing

There is no substitute for a home. Therefore, there is no effective discipline on the amount of rent that landlords can charge, and renters will go without food and heating to pay the rent. A free market of profit-maximising landlords is inherently incapable of providing decent housing for poor people. Rising rents relative to income are a major contributor to rising destitution in the UK. People on low incomes are forced to work long hours and are still unable to lead healthy and flourishing lives. Affordable rent should be defined by reference to the Minimum Wage, and housing benefits increased. Furthermore, recent policies, such as the removal of what has been framed as a spare room subsidy (the ‘bedroom tax’) for social housing tenants, have exacerbated hardship and stress for poorer families.

  • Immediately unfreeze Local Housing allowances and increase them in line with local property rental prices.

  • Immediately revoke the bedroom tax on social housing tenants.

The best long term solution is to diversify the housing market so that there are many not-for-profit organisations providing affordable housing including voluntary groups, housing associations and elected authorities. In the short term, rent caps should be applied to require rents to rise below any rises in minimum wages. Councils should have the option of utilising properties that have not been occupied for more than a year, splitting the rent, set fairly, with the owner.

  • Establish and implement rent controls.

  • Allow councils to take control of properties that have not been occupied for over a year.

  • Increase the share of housing controlled by the not-for-profit sector.

The quality of much rental property is a health risk. Local authorities should be required to monitor housing standards and given real powers, including confiscation of the property and, in extreme cases, criminal charges. Although this imposes additional costs on local authorities, it is likely that this measure will reduce costs to the health and social services to the extent that there would be a net gain to the public purse.

  • Require councils to monitor standards of rented property, with the necessary powers to intervene.

With an ageing population there is a shortage of housing options for older people, forcing them to remain in unsuitable, sometimes larger, properties even though they may not want to. The Housing Our Ageing Population Panel for Innovation (HAPPI, 2016) has produced design principles and a series of reports about housing options for older people in both urban and rural areas as their needs may differ. However, if homes were truly built for life, they could be built with the qualities and accessibility features that would enable people to remain in their homes and communities, if they wished.

  • Change building regulations to make all new homes ‘accessible and adaptable’ as the baseline standard – also known as M4(2) in building regulations.

Reducing the cost of housing in a post-growth world

Reducing the cost of housing is essential for the degrowth transition. If households spend less on housing, the costs of food, energy and consumer goods can rise to include their environmental costs. With a long term goal of people being able to live on a 21-hour working week (Coote et al., 2010), affordable rent would be defined as 20–30% of income, i.e. 4.2–6.3x the minimum hourly wage for single person units and double that for family units.

 

Appendix 3: Reforming taxation, for people and planet

We need to transform taxation towards a system that progressively taxes use of energy and resources, wealth, property and land value, taking into account falling government revenue (other things being equal) from managed economic contraction.

We can use taxation to do five main things to help bring about what we are proposing. We can use taxation

1) to reduce environmental damage and increase protections.

2) as a way of reducing economic inequalities.

3) for macroeconomic management of the economy.

4) to help secure adequate funds for government spending.

5) to prevent or redress the accumulation of surplus (profits) and power by large commercial organisations.

The following proposals make a start on these things. We do note that as the shape and size of the economy changes, both as a result of the changes proposed in this report and due to the imposition of planetary and ecological constraints on economic activity, the yield from taxes will change over time, often in a downwards direction.

Better taxes, for people and planet

We need effective taxes on wealth, a land tax, a much more progressive income tax and greater levels of corporation tax. Taxes on expenditure should differentially fall on those most able to contribute, for example high VAT levels on luxury/high carbon goods and services but not on the things people need for their everyday needs. To incentivise production and consumption that reduces or minimises environmental harm, there can be preferential tax rates for labour-intensive, low impact services and goods. The imperative for a fairer and more redistributive tax system will be greater under conditions of managed contraction of material flows: the argument that everyone will benefit from a growing cake will no longer be tenable, since the cake will not be growing. Redistribution is back! Our overall recommendation is therefore to:

  • Establish a programme to make the UK tax system much more redistributive.

Detailed illustrative policy proposals follow.

Wealth

Murphy (2023c) has argued that a wealth tax would be technically very difficult to implement and would produce levels of revenue that, if those difficulties could be overcome, could be difficult for the government to spend effectively. He argues that alternative means for targeting inequalities in wealth could be deployed. We consider, however, that such a tax is desirable on grounds of economic justice and should be a medium term goal. Moreover, since it is a tax on economic stock, rather than economic flows, receipts from it would be less vulnerable to contracting economic activity. According to the 2020 report of the Wealth Tax Commission (Advani et al., 2020), taxing those worth more than £250,000 at 1% of the value of their assets annually for a period of five years, would yield £387bn for the public purse. Even a one-off tax would make a significant contribution. We agree that excessive wealth can immediately be taxed by reforming a number of existing taxes, prior to a more ambitious total overhaul of the tax system in the context of the new and accelerating economic realities of an ecologically constrained world.

  • In the medium term, establish a wealth tax.

Dividends and interest

Currently, there is a tax-free allowance on dividends of £1,000. The tax rates are all lower than those for other income.

For dividends the rates (as of November, 2023) are:

Tax band

Tax rate on dividends over the tax-free allowance

Basic rate

8.75%

Higher rate

33.75%

Additional rate

39.35%

We propose equalising the rates with the rates for other income (see below) and abolishing the tax-free band for dividends.

  • Equalise the tax on dividends with that on other income. Abolish the tax-free band.

For interest (on savings and bank deposits), the arrangements (November, 2023) work like this: If your income is below £17,570, your interest is untaxed. Those on the basic rate of income tax have a tax-free allowance of £1,000 and those on the higher rate an allowance of £500. After those allowances, you are taxed as for your main income sources (e.g. wages and pensions). We suggest leaving this arrangement largely as it is, but removing the tax-free band for incomes above £45k. There is some controversy over whether savings deposits should be discouraged in a post-growth economy (Lange, 2018).

  • Remove the tax-free band for interest on incomes above £45k.

Capital gains

Capital gains are paid on capital proceeds other than on sales of a main residence. These capital gains represent unearned income. Currently, the rates are only 10% (or 18% on residential property) for the basic rate band and 20% (or 28% on residential property) on any amount above the basic tax rate. That is well below the rates on income. We propose raising Capital Gains Tax (CGT) to a flat 28% at the lower band and 40% (same as higher rate income tax) for the higher band. Our calculation indicates that this would raise some £40Bn p.a. (current CGT revenue is £17.8Bn for this year). We would also considerably reduce the allowance (now £12,500 per year) on gains before tax is levied to a nominal figure.

  • Align Capital Gains Tax with income tax and equalise rates on residential property with other taxable gains.

Inheritance tax

The ability to pass wealth from generation to generation is generally seen as a right, but it perpetuates inequality and unfair advantage–disadvantage. We do not propose removing the right altogether but instead to reduce the impact of intergenerational transfers on death by making changes to Inheritance Tax (IHT). The tax-free allowance, currently £325,000 or £500,000 for a main residence, is too high. It could comfortably be reduced by 50%: Inheritors would still get £162,500 (or £250,000) free of tax and then pay just 40% on gains above the threshold. The other exemptions (Business relief, Pension Funds relief and Agricultural property relief, should all be reviewed).

  • Halve the IHT free bands. Review the other exemptions.

Unrealised assets

At present, valuable assets are not taxed until they are sold; people sitting on large assets do not pay tax on them and often wait until a good time to sell. Such large holdings could be taxed at an annual rate.

  • Consider taxing unrealised (sitting) assets.

Land value tax

A fair and progressive land tax could be instituted, proportionate to the returns from land. That would target owners of multiple properties and big land holdings and also disincentivise land banking/speculation, thereby reducing housing costs and the cost of agricultural land. It would be designed to exempt small farmers and people’s main residence (unless the value were more than, say, 3 times the median valuation). Note that this tax would take some time to implement, since it would require valuation of all eligible land assets and careful design to prevent avoidance and evasion.

  • Introduce a land value tax with appropriate exemptions.

Council tax

There is a need to re-band and adjust the relative rates charged on the UK property stock. This would make the tax fairer and remove anomalies. The withdrawal of grant support has made Local Authorities more dependent on council tax and areas with lower property values miss out without compensatory central mechanisms. There could also be differential rates for under-occupied properties to encourage the freeing of family-sized accommodation and thereby helping reduce inflationary housing market pressures.

  • Re-band and adjust the relative council tax rates on a progressive size basis. Introduce compensatory measures for councils receiving lower per capita council tax income.

Business rates

Business rates are punitive for many small businesses but not for larger ones. There could be a generous zero rate band and a steeply rising rate for larger enterprises. Again, council financing will require compensatory adjustment.

  • Restructure business rates to help smaller companies. Compensate councils for any losses and regional disparities.

Corporation tax

Corporation tax is charged at:

19% for taxable profits below £50,000 (small profit rate)

25% for taxable profits above £250,000 (main rate).

Marginal Relief provides a gradual increase in the corporation tax rate between the small profits rate and the main rate.

The lower rate could be increased to the level in Belgium, Netherlands, France, Spain and Turkey (around 25%), but with a lower (10%) band for companies with profits below £20,000 and the higher rate increased to, say, 30%. This would be fair. The smallest companies tend to deliver most value to local economies and have higher unit administrative costs, while the largest ones have advantages including economies of scale and oligopolist leverage on costs. Murphy (2023b) suggests that a similar proposal would realise some £7Bn p.a.

  • Increase corporation tax to 25% for companies with profits in the range of £20–50k and 30% for those with profits above £50k. Introduce a lower 10% band for those with profits below £20k.

Pensions

Higher rate taxpayers currently enjoy a greater tax subsidy for their pension contributions. Murphy (2023a) has suggested that eliminating ‘the higher rate of tax relief provided on pension contributions to those who are 40% and 45% taxpayers in the UK, could by itself raise at least £12.5 billion of extra tax – plus a further £2 billion in National Insurance’.

  • Abolish higher rate tax relief on pension contributions.

Taxation on goods and services

‘”You’re not serious unless you’re rewriting the tax code.” And that’s the evidence of whether you are going to fix climate policy.’ (Griffith & Roberts, 2023)

Currently, goods and services are subject to Value Added Tax. While food and a number of basic necessities like children’s clothes are zero-rated, the tax is regressive with poor people paying a larger proportion of their income in VAT than richer people. A better approach to raising revenue while reducing unnecessary, damaging consumption would be as follows:

  • Tax goods and services according to their carbon and water footprint. This could be done via a number of bands and categories for goods.

  • Tax imports according to their embodied carbon.

In 2022 the government decided not to pursue a carbon tax. It has just consulted on a carbon border tax, oriented at reducing the advantage that other economies have if their carbon price is lower than ours, i.e. it is linked to the carbon trading scheme. While we find market methods of curbing emissions to be inherently flawed, we do support the concept of a carbon border tax. See the section on energy. A possible place to start would be a heavy tax on air-freighted foodstuffs which in any case tend to be based on an intensive cash crop model that damages both communities and ecologies.

Currently, there are relevant taxes such as fuel duty (£23Bn, frozen for decades), vehicle excise (£8.1Bn) and air passenger duty (£3.8Bn). These are set too low to offer a sufficient disincentive for high carbon products and services. Taxation on luxury goods and services would be distributionally just and, in the case of air travel, popular (Büchs & Mattioli, 2024; Mattioli & Büchs, 2022). As road vehicles transition to electric power, the receipts from fuel duty will fall. However, vehicles are becoming progressively larger and heavier (Horton, 2023). Even battery-powered vehicles constitute a danger to unprotected users of public spaces and they also have a negative impact on road surfaces. Therefore, vehicle taxation should transition to a size and mass-based tariff.

  • Taxation should penalise large and heavy vehicles while leasing schemes should be regulated so they do not incentivise frequent replacement.

Restructuring income tax

Last but not least, income tax badly needs reforming. In a review of policy proposals for degrowth, Parrique (2019) suggested an income tax system that would create a maximum income of around €90,000 per year for a single person after taxes (about £80,000 at current exchange rate, 2024). The minimum income (before additional subsidies, in the form of welfare benefits or potentially a universal income, universal basic services, etc.) suggested was €9,964 (£8,000). Our proposal draws on that framework but with two changes: 1) it includes a small negative income tax rate of 10% for incomes below the first tax threshold (this is not in place of benefit payments). 2) For reasons of likely political acceptability, we have not set a top 100% rate, but two top rates of 95% above £90,000 and 99% above £100,000 which will have a similar effect. The resulting tax rates are as follows:

Proposal

 

Current UK taxation

Bottom of Band £

Top of band £

Rate per cent

 

Bottom of Band £

Top of band £

Rate

0

15,000

-10%

 

0

12,570

0%

15,001

25,000

10%

 

12,571

52,700

20%

25,001

45,000

20%

 

52,701

125,140

40%

45,001

70,000

40%

 

125,141

 

45%

70,001

90,000

80%

 

 

 

 

90,001

100,000

95%

 

 

 

 

100,001

 

99%

 

 

 

 


This results in the pattern shown below. The first graph includes an income of £500,000 p.a.; the second excludes this so that the pattern can be more clearly seen for the other incomes. The third shows how the overall yield is somewhat higher but, more importantly, the take is higher from those with higher incomes and lower from those with lower incomes.

A proposal for fairer income tax

A proposal for fairer income tax, excluding the highest incomes.

 

Comparative yield of existing vs proposed income tax arrangements.

 

  • Implement a truly progressive income tax settlement along the lines we have outlined, effectively capping the highest incomes.

 

Tax avoidance

Wealthy people notoriously find ways to avoid (and evade) payment of tax.

  • Reduce the number of legal options for avoiding tax and improve on catching those evading payment. The latter should focus on wealthy people rather than on poorer people struggling to make ends meet.

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Version 5, March, 2024

1
  • A manifesto prepared by members of the degrowthuk network
    The authors are Mark H Burton, Carolyn Kagan, Rebecca Saville, David Madigan. We also acknowledge contributions by Dan Chester, Luis Palicio and Selda Ulucanclar.
    We are grateful to the following for comments and suggestions: Alan Simpson, Anna Coote, Elena Hofferberth, Joel Millward Hopkins, Tim Lang, James Moura Ferreira, Jason Hickel, Caroline Whyte, Julia Steinberger, Milena Büchs, Jefim Vögel, Tony Woodward,and Gudrun Stummer who also copy-edited the report.

2
  • These are derived from the three guiding principles of Permaculture. However, the wording and framing here is ours.

3
  • ​​ That does not mean no building but it flips the default from build to not build. Exceptions could be new-build housing for rural workers involved in landscape and nature restoration or working in regenerative cultivation.

4
  • ​​ Greater Manchester is adopting this from 2028, albeit with the caveat of financial viability and the use of carbon offset payments to a local green investment fund (Greater Manchester Combined Authority, 2023).

5
  • These are “…passive houses, low-energy buildings or near/net zero energy or emission (NZEB) buildings”. See (Röck et al., 2020, p. 5).

6
  • The 2023 Local Edge report is helpful in setting out how this could be achieved (Lucas et al., 2023). See also (Price & Wood, 2024) on community energy in Wales.

7
  • Based on the overall Local Edge report recommendation(Lucas et al., 2023).

8
  • ​​ This is not a call for restrictive anti-migrant employment policies but for a locality focus on job development for everyone present in an area.

9
  • UK Food Security Report (Department for Food, Environment and Rural Affairs, 2023a updated edition).

10
  • A higher figure, between 8–10% is cited in several secondary sources, but this appears to be an error that has been perpetuated. The WRI report (Sadowski et al., 2021) from which the 1-3% range is taken, seems more robust.

11
  • ​​ NHS services are probably too large and complicated to run as a council department, hence our provisional proposal for a linked but separate democratic board.

12
  • ​​ Essentially the policy of the Labour Party before 2020 (see Meadway, 2019)

13

​​ In May, 2023, for example, the government still had a 38.69% share in NatWest Bank. NS&I, of course is part of the State.

14
  • ​​ See for example, (Gamble & Kelly, 1996; The Labour Party, 2017).

15
  • ​​ £52.1 Bn at the end of the financial year 2022-3.

16
  • ​​ The term Global North refers to the USA, Canada, Europe, Israel, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, whereas the term Global South refers to the rest of the world: Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

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  • ​​ This refers to the material scale of the economy which is not necessarily the same as the scale of its monetary value, although as can be seen from the decoupling literature referred to above, the two are usually very closely linked.

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